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Summary
This report is one of a series of outputs from the independent evaluation of a programme of 
projects demonstrating the direct payment of Housing Beneit to social renting tenants across 
the UK. It highlights the key indings of an analysis of participating landlords’ rent accounts 
for the 18 months the programme was ‘live’.
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Glossary of terms and list of 
abbreviations
Baseline Survey This was a household survey that was undertaken at 
the beginning of the evaluation in order to generate a 
‘baseline’ position for tenants in the Project Areas. It 
involved 1,965 tenants being interviewed by researchers 
from Ipsos MORI between May and July 2012.
Credit This a payment onto the rent account (see below for a 
deinition of ‘payment’).
CRESR Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research at 
Shefield Hallam University.
Debit This is a charge onto rent accounts which include rent 
and service charges.
DP Direct payment
DPDP Direct Payment Demonstration Project. The DPDPs, 
of which there are six, demonstrated the payment of 
Housing Beneit directly to social rented sector tenants. 
The six projects are: Edinburgh; Oxford; Shropshire; 
Southwark; Torfaen; and Wakeield.
Direct payment The payment of Housing Beneit direct to tenants.
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
HB Housing Beneit
Eligible rent Rent and service charges eligible for Housing Beneit.
IM Ipsos MORI
In-scope Tenants in the Project Areas eligible for DPDP, i.e. those 
of working age and not in temporary accommodation and 
short-term supported accommodation.
Landlord payment The payment of Housing Beneit directly to landlords.
Payments This represents all debits – rent payments and third party 
payments, such as water bills – to rent accounts.
Project Area Direct Payment Demonstration Project Area
RAA Rent Account Analysis
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Rebasing This technique, which involves reconiguring rent account 
data so that tenants’ direct payment ‘journey’ starts at 
the same point, allows the study team to factor into its 
analysis the (important) fact that tenants have been 
moved onto DPDP at different times through a phased 
process, which makes disentangling the impact of DP 
over time more dificult.
Rent arrears Rent arrears are accrued when rent payments over a 
given period are less than the rent owed.
Rent owed This represents all credits – rent and service charges – 
going onto rent accounts.
Rent payment periods Rent payment periods are a construct devised by the 
study team to facilitate its analysis. They comprise four 
week periods, or a month in the case of Edinburgh, over 
which landlords would expect tenant rent accounts to 
balance.
Rate of payment per This is the rate of period rent payments to rent owed
payment period  with the value rent indicating the percentage of debits 
accounted for by credits in the period.
RSRS Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy
Safeguarding The process by which tenants who were assessed as 
being unsuitable for direct payment were removed from 
the DPDP programme. 
Switchback The return of a tenant who has fallen into arrears on direct 
payment back to landlord payment.
Switch forward The return to direct payment of a tenant who has been 
switched back.
Third Party Payments Payments onto a tenant’s rent account made by a third 
party, not the tenant.
Trigger point The length of time that may elapse before tenants return 
to landlord payment in demonstration projects. The trigger 
period varies across the six demonstration projects.
UC Universal Credit
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Executive summary
Context
This report is one of a series of outputs from the independent evaluation of a programme 
of projects demonstrating the direct payment of Housing Beneit (HB) to social renting 
tenants across Great Britain. The evaluation was undertaken by a research consortium 
from the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research (CRESR) at Shefield Hallam 
University, the Institute of Social Policy at the University of Oxford, and Ipsos MORI (IM). 
The evaluation, which began in January 2012 was funded by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP).
In January 2012, DWP established a programme of Direct Payment Demonstration Projects 
(DPDP) to pioneer and test the direct payment of HB to social rented tenants in ive areas 
(Oxford, Southwark, Shropshire, Torfaen, and Wakeield), with a sixth area (Edinburgh) joining 
in May 2012. Under the present system, HB for tenants living in the social rented sector is 
usually paid directly to the landlord. However, in October 2013, the process of rolling out 
direct payment to all HB recipients began as part of the new Universal Credit (UC).1 UC is a 
new integrated beneit for people of working age, comprising a single monthly payment and 
replacing a range of income-related in-work and out-of-work beneits, including HB.
DWP commissioned the research consortium to conduct an evaluation of the DPDP with 
an emphasis on continued learning and feedback into UC design. A key objective of the 
research was to highlight the impact of direct payment on landlord cash lows and their 
inancial sustainability and this was principally achieved by analysis of landlords’ rent account 
data and HB data. Interim results were presented after 12 months of the DPDP (see Direct 
Payment Demonstration Projects: 12 months in extended learning report, DWP Research 
Report No. 876 and Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key indings of the 12 months’ 
Rent Account Analysis exercise, DWP Research Report No. 879), while this report presents 
the results for the full 18 months of the DPDP. It is important to note that this report is one of 
many outputs produced by the study team and should be read alongside them.
The report is timely because: 
• it represents one of the most comprehensive and in-depth analyses of the rent accounts of 
social housing landlords in this country;
• with the roll-out of UC gaining momentum, the indings should be of interest to a range of 
stakeholders including government, regulators of social housing, social housing landlords, 
lenders, support agencies, and tenants.
1 This process began in the UC Pathinders: www.gov.uk/government/news/universal-
credit-progress.
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Key indings
When the DPDP programme was conceived there was concern that the rent arrears of 
participating landlords would increase very dramatically. This did not happen – there was a 
consensus amongst local stakeholders and lenders that they had not increased as much as 
had been anticipated. Direct payment in the DPDP did have a inancial impact on landlords 
and tenants but much of this burden was borne in the irst few months following migration. 
In fact, nearly half of the difference between the amount of rent paid and owed during the 18 
months of the DPDP was accrued in the irst month/four-week period2 following migration.
By the end of the 18 months of the programme: rent payment rates amongst tenants who 
had been on direct payment for the duration were 2.2 percentage points lower than amongst 
a comparator sample of tenants not on direct payment; and the net additional impact3 of 
direct payment in these later payment periods4 was 2.1 percentage points less rent paid than 
if direct payment had not been introduced. A clear picture emerged, then, of a distinct and 
signiicant drop in rent payment rates when tenants irst migrated to direct payment. Payment 
rates then improved dramatically over time, stabilising at slightly below both baseline and 
comparator rates. These results point clearly to the need for mitigating action during the 
transition to direct payment, whether in the form of support to tenants, close monitoring 
of rent accounts, cautious assessments of tenants’ readiness for direct payment, ongoing 
support assessment processes or other intervention. Improving payment rates during 
tenants’ irst three payments would reduce the negative impact of direct payments on tenants 
and on landlords’ income signiicantly. 
The detail of these key indings is as follows.
• Overall, tenants who went onto direct payment in the DPDP paid 95.5 per cent of all the 
rent owed, compared with a comparator sample (not on direct payment) who paid 99.1 per 
cent of rent owed (a difference of 3.6 percentage points). However, this masks signiicant 
variation over time. For example, in payment period 1 the average payment rate was 67 
per cent but after payment period 3, average payment rates stabilised at slightly below 
baseline and comparator levels, and occasionally higher. The payment rate in payment 
period 185 was 99 per cent.
2 The English and Welsh project areas operated a four-weekly beneit cycle while in 
Edinburgh tenants’ HB was paid monthly.
3 ‘Net additional impact’ refers to the estimated impact over and above what might have 
been expected in the absence of DP and is assessed using statistical modelling.
4 ‘Payment periods’ or ‘rent payment periods’ refer to the four-week period, or a month in 
the case of Edinburgh, over which landlords would expect tenant rent accounts to 
balance. ‘Payment period’ 1 therefore refers to the rent cycle (i.e. the period for which 
rent is due) following a irst direct payment of HB, regardless of the calendar month in 
which that payment was made. Payment period 2 refers to the rent cycle following the 
second direct payment of HB and so on. By payment period 18, only those tenants who 
were transferred onto direct payment at the start of the DPDP remain in the sample.
5 Payment period 18 refers to the period following a tenant’s 18th direct payment of HB. 
This igure therefore only relates to tenants who went onto direct payment at the start 
of the DPDP and remained on direct payment for the duration. Tenants who were 
transferred onto direct payment later in the DPDP could not have received 18 direct 
payments of HB.
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• Controlling for other factors, overall, the net additional impact of direct payment was 
5.5 percentage points less rent paid, i.e. tenants paid 5.5 percentage points less rent, 
on average, than they would have done had their HB been paid direct to their landlord. 
However, the net additional impact reduced dramatically over time from 15.7 percentage 
points less rent paid in the irst three payment periods, to 2.1 percentage points less rent 
paid in payment periods 16-18.
• Being on direct payment was found to increase the likelihood of tenants not paying all 
of their rent. In total, 61 per cent of direct payment tenants had accrued arrears in their 
time on DPDP compared with 39 per cent of a comparator sample. Again, however, the 
proportion of tenants underpaying was far greater in the irst payment period: 
59 per cent of tenants underpaid or failed to pay their rent following their irst direct 
payment of HB but the proportion underpaying or failing to pay quickly returned to baseline 
levels. It is important to note here that the value of underpayment continued to be higher 
under direct payment so although the overall proportion of tenants underpaying fell 
dramatically, those who did underpay tended to do so by a larger amount. This explains 
how direct payment continued to have an impact even though the proportion of tenants 
underpaying did not differ greatly from the baseline level. 
• In total, 48 per cent of the shortfall in rent not collected during the 18 months of the DPDP 
accrued in the irst payment period and 65 per cent accrued in the irst three payment 
periods.
• The ‘arrears spike’ which emerged at the start of the DPDP cannot be explained just with 
reference to the infancy of DPDP and the experimental nature of early implementation. 
Tenants who went onto direct payment later in the DPDP, once learning had accrued 
and processes adapted accordingly, still displayed relatively low irst payment rates. An 
arrears spike was less pronounced, but still evident. Relatively low initial payment rates 
are, therefore, likely to be a feature of the implementation of direct payment going forward 
unless mitigating action is taken.
• The particularly low payment rate in the early stages of being on direct payment has the 
effect of depressing overall DPDP payment rates. The question arises, then, of what 
effect might mitigating action have? If the irst three payment periods are removed from 
the analysis (or the ‘arrears spike’ were completely mitigated going forward) the impact 
of direct payment reduces dramatically. Overall the proportion of rent paid to rent due, for 
example, increases from 95.5 per cent to 97.9 per cent; the net additional impact of direct 
payment reduces from 5.5 per cent less rent paid to 2.5 per cent less rent paid; and the 
value of the shortfall between total rent due and paid falls from £1.9m to £648,000.
• The fact that payment rates improved signiicantly after the irst few payment periods is good 
news. Direct payment does continue to impact on landlords and tenants in the longer term, 
however. Once tenants have been receiving direct payment for 16 periods or more they still, 
on average, pay 2.1 percentage points less rent in a given period than if their HB were paid 
to their landlord. In effect, direct payment introduced a step-change in rent accounts in the 
DPDP and landlords will need to manage the inancial implications of that shift.
• Tenants who switched back had much lower overall payment rates during their time on 
direct payment than tenants who did not switch back (79.5 per cent compared with 96.8 
per cent of tenants who never switched back). While we cannot predict these tenants’ 
future payment behaviour had they not switched back, these results strongly suggest that 
the switchback mechanism did contribute to limiting further arrears.
14
Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 
Key indings of the 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise
• Underpayment was much more common than non-payment in the sense that more tenants 
underpaid than did not pay at all. However, non-payment had a more signiicant impact on 
the total value of arrears than underpayment.
• Amongst those tenants who failed to pay some or all of their rent, underpayment by a 
‘large’ amount was more prevalent under a direct payment system. Those who underpaid 
by more than half their rent doubled in the irst 12 months of the DPDP and 
non-payment trebled.
• Tenants who failed to pay all their rent were more likely to underpay erratically than persistently.
• The majority of the ‘best payers’ (i.e. tenants who paid all their rent while on direct 
payments), paid their rent late at some point. Late payment has an impact on landlord 
cash low. However, DPDP tenant payment patterns did not differ markedly from the 
comparator sample suggesting that late payment is an issue that transcends, and 
precedes the introduction of direct payment. In total, 79 per cent of tenants who paid all 
their rent while on direct payments made at least one late payment, compared with 77 per 
cent of the comparator sample.
• There was no clear ‘arrears spike’ at any particular time of the calendar year, including the 
Christmas period. 
• Although the payment behaviour of tenants who initially failed to pay some or all of their 
rent quickly improved (see above), much of the difference between the value of rent paid 
and rent owed accrued in the early stages of direct payment had not been repaid by the 
end of the 18 months of the DPDP. The shift to direct payment, therefore, represented a 
negative step-change in the overall rent account balances for those who did not pay all of 
their rent in the irst three payment periods. Seventy-nine per cent of tenants who accrued 
arrears during the irst three direct payment periods were still in arrears in the inal period.
• A series of factors relating to the circumstances and characteristics of tenants were found 
to affect the impact of direct payments on rent arrears. Tenants who paid their rent by 
Direct Debit were less likely to underpay, as were ‘older’ tenants, i.e. those over the age 
of 55. Conversely, tenants with relatively high rents (i.e. more than £115 per week), non-
working tenants and those under the age of 25, were more likely to underpay, as were 
‘single person’ households.
• Analysis of the impact of the Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS) suggests that 
the RSRS impacted slightly on payment rates in the DPDP but not markedly. There is 
some evidence that the RSRS had slightly less impact on direct payment tenants’ payment 
rates, than on the comparator sample.
• In the DPDP, direct payment was associated with a greater likelihood of entering 
employment, although the results must be treated with great caution. Using (imprecise) 
proxy indicators, the proportion of DPDP tenants in work increased from 21 to 23 per cent 
while the proportion of comparator sample tenants in work remained static at 21 per cent. 
This difference is statistically signiicant at a 0.05 level.
• Landlords involved in the DPDP reported costs associated with delivering direct 
payments, over and above any additional arrears accrued. They were unable to provide 
comprehensive and robust data and so it is not possible to quantify those costs, or the 
full impact of direct payment on landlord inances. However, the evidence landlords 
have supplied as part of the wider evaluation suggests that areas where increased 
costs were incurred include: staff time, which was seen as being the biggest cost; the 
cost of upgrading and improving rent collection and recovery IT systems; the cost of 
communicating with tenants; and transaction costs.
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1 Context
1.1 Introduction 
This report is one of a series of outputs from the independent evaluation of a programme of 
projects demonstrating the direct payment of Housing Beneit (HB) to social renting tenants 
across Britain. The evaluation was undertaken by a research consortium from the Centre 
for Regional Economic and Social Research (CRESR) at Shefield Hallam University, the 
Institute of Social Policy at the University of Oxford, and Ipsos MORI (IM).
The evaluation, which began in January 2012 and which concluded with publication of this report 
and the two that accompany it,6 was funded by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).
In January 2012, DWP established a programme of Direct Payment Demonstration Projects 
(DPDPs) to pioneer and test the direct payment of HB to social rented tenants in ive areas 
(Oxford, Southwark, Shropshire, Torfaen, and Wakeield), with a sixth area (Edinburgh) being 
added in May 2012. Under the present system, HB for tenants living in the social rented sector 
is usually paid directly to the landlord. However, in October 2013, the process of rolling out 
direct payment to all HB recipients began as part of the new Universal Credit (UC). UC is a 
new integrated beneit for people of working age, comprising a single monthly payment and 
replacing a range of income-related in-work and out-of-work beneits, including HB.
DWP commissioned the research consortium to conduct an evaluation of the DPDPs with an 
emphasis on continued learning and feedback into UC design. The DPDPs tested some key 
elements of the social sector housing support under UC:
• they explored and tested a range of safeguard mechanisms for tenants and landlords;
• they supported tenants through the process in different ways; and
• they engaged with par tner agencies and inancial institutions, to greater and lesser 
degrees.
A key objective of the research was to highlight the impact of direct payment on landlords’ 
cash lows and their inancial sustainability. This was principally achieved by analysis 
of landlords’ rent account data at two points in time: 12 and 18 months into the DPDP 
programme. This report presents the indings for the full 18 months of the DPDP programme. 
In order to keep this report as accessible as possible technical information relating to the 
approach and analysis is presented in technical endnotes which appear at the end of the 
document. These technical endnotes appear as roman numerals, while chapter speciic 
footnotes appear as numbers.
6 Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key indings of the programme evaluation – 
inal report, DWP Research Report No. 890 and Direct Payments Demonstration 
Projects: The longitudinal survey of tenants, DWP Research Report No. 889.
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1.2 Direct Payment Demonstration Projects 
programme
On 14 September 2011 Lord Freud, the Minister for Welfare Reform, announced that six 
DPDPs would be created to ‘test some key elements of social sector housing support under 
UC while protecting social landlords ‘inancial position’. This would involve two signiicant 
changes for (the up to 2,000) working-age7 claimants in each of the six Project Areas:
• receiving HB payments once every four weeks8 (broadly in-line with monthly payments 
under UC) as opposed to weekly or fortnightly; and
• paying rent to tenants themselves.
Social housing landlords were invited to take part in the programme, which was originally 
planned to run for a year, and DWP received over 70 expressions of interest from local 
authorities and registered housing providers. From these, DWP received 23 applications. 
A range of criteria was used to select projects including geography: the sample selected 
ideally had to include partnerships from London, the North of England, the South of England, 
Scotland and Wales. It also had to ideally include at least one Large Scale Voluntary 
Transfer (LSVT) housing association. Five successful partnerships in England and Wales 
were announced on 19 January 2012 and a sixth – in Scotland – joined the programme in 
May 2012. The six DPDPs were:
• Oxford – Oxford City Council and Oxford Citizens Housing Association (OCHA), trading as 
part of the GreenSquare Housing Group, Southern England;
• Shropshire – Shropshire Council, Bromford Group, Sanctuary Housing and The Wrekin 
Housing Trust, West Midlands;
• Southwark – London Borough of Southwark and Family Mosaic, London;
• Torfaen – Torfaen Borough Council, Bron Afon Community Housing and Charter Housing, 
South-East Wales;
• Wakeield – Wakeield Council and Wakeield and District Housing, Northern England;
• Edinburgh – City of Edinburgh Council and Dunedin Canmore Housing Association, 
Scotland.
The overall aim of the DPDP was to highlight key lessons and learning points in terms of the 
direct payment of HB to feed into UC design ahead of its introduction from October 2013. 
More speciically, the projects were concerned with: exploring the effects of direct payment 
on landlords and tenants; examining the effectiveness of the different types of support 
provided to tenants to help them prepare for and manage direct payment; and testing direct 
payment safeguard mechanisms for landlords.
This was achieved by a support assessment process and varying across the projects the 
length of time (or switchback trigger period) for a return to landlord payment after tenants 
7 In addition to non-working-age tenants, it should also be noted that tenants in 
temporary and supported accommodation on a short-term basis are also exempt 
from the programme.
8 In the Edinburgh project, HB is being paid to tenants monthly.
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had fallen into arrears.9 Three of the projects had an eight-week (or equivalent) trigger 
period (Oxford, Torfaen, and Wakeield); Edinburgh had a one-month trigger period, while 
Southwark and Shropshire had four-week and 12-week triggers respectively. In terms of the 
criteria to be used for determining when tenants were to be switched back and how arrears 
were to be measured and deined, there was a programme-wide agreement that it would 
happen when:
• ‘Trigger 1 – the tenant’s rent arrears arising during the Demonstration Project period 
equalled the amount of (a month/4/8/12 weeks) rent for that tenant;
• Trigger 2 – the tenant had not paid any rent for (a month/4/8/12 weeks) during the 
Demonstration Project period;
• Trigger 3 – the tenant had underpaid her/his Rent by 15 per cent or more in each of the 
periods of four weeks in the preceding 12 weeks, falling within the Demonstration Project 
period;
• Trigger 4 – the tenant had underpaid her/his rent by 15 per cent or more in the preceding 
period of 12 weeks, falling within the Demonstration Project period.’10
Working alongside the DWP, the English, Welsh and Scottish projects began work preparing 
for direct payment in their areas in January 2012, with work beginning in Edinburgh in May 
2012.i The English and Welsh projects went ‘live’ in June and July of 2012 when the irst 
phase of tenants were moved onto direct payment, with Edinburgh following suit in August 
2012. Relecting differences in the preparedness of tenants to move onto direct payment, it 
was decided to adopt a phased approach to moving tenants onto the programme, with those 
in the irst phase assessed as being most prepared to go onto it. Although the number of 
phases varied by Project Area, all had undertaken their last one by the beginning of 2013. 
In all, by March 2013, a total of 7,004 tenants had gone onto direct payment. As Table 1.1 
reveals, ‘in-scope’ numbers were fairly similar in ive of the areas (Edinburgh, Shropshire, 
Southwark, Torfaen, and Wakeield) with there being one ‘outlier’, Oxford, which put 1,742 
tenants onto direct payment. 
Table 1.1 Number of tenants transferred onto direct payment








Source: DWP monitoring information, March 2013.
9 It is important to note that, in many respects, including how tenants are assessed for 
direct payment, the context under UC will be different to that in the DPDP.
10 Written submission provided by a DWP Relationship Manager.
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According to DWP monitoring data, 1,993 tenants were switched back during the 18 
months of the programme, with Shropshire recording the lowest number of switchbacks and 
Southwark the highest (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2 Number of tenants switched back 








Source: DWP monitoring data.
By March 2013 nearly two-thirds of the 1,031 ‘switchbacks’ that had occurred by that 
time been under triggers 3 and 4. Relecting this, DWP asked the research consortium to 
undertake bespoke research into this group when it decided to extend the DPDP programme 
and evaluation in May 2013.11 
1.3 Research objectives and approach
The main aim of the research programme was to monitor and evaluate the preparation, 
delivery and effectiveness of the DPDPs, learning lessons about effective implementation 
to feed into relevant aspects of UC design and future housing policy and strategy. 
The evaluation monitored the effect of direct payment on tenants, landlords and other 
stakeholders such as support agencies, lenders, and local authorities.12 
In exploring these issues the evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach which 
comprised the following activities: tenant surveys; in-depth qualitative interviews with tenants 
and stakeholders; and an analysis of participating landlord rent accounts and management 
costs, a process which was referred to as ‘Rent Account Analysis (RAA)’. RAA took place 
at two points in time (12 months and 18 months) so as to assess the impact of direct 
payment over time. The approach taken to the 18-months’ exercise, the indings of which are 
presented in this report, is highlighted in the next chapter. In addition to this report, the study 
team has published eight others, details of which can be found in the technical endnotes.
1.4 Nature, scope and structure of this report
In order to keep this report as accessible and digestible as possible, the analysis is arranged 
around a series of research questions that the study team generated in partnership with 
11 DWP only collected disaggregated data at one point in time: March 2013 and so more 
recent information on the breakdown of switchbacks by trigger point is not available.
12 These objectives did not change with the extension of the evaluation. However, the 
study team were also asked to explore if (and how) recent welfare reforms, such as the 
Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS), impacted on the DPDP.
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DWP and projects. Before moving on to consider the indings, it is important to highlight a 
number of health warnings about this report:
• again with accessibility in mind, the commentary focuses on highlighting noteworthy 
indings and, quite intentionally, does not ‘mechanically’ report on all the analysis 
presented within the report;
• it is important that the report is not seen in isolation as it is one of many outputs being 
produced by the study team that seek to highlight the impact of direct payment. And, as such, 
it should be read alongside them, with the Final Learning Report being of particular relevance;
• the report is concerned with updating the 12-months’ report which was published earlier 
this year. In doing so, it highlights noteworthy trends and patterns to emerge from the inal 
six months of the programme and provides complete, programme level data for its entirety 
– the DPDPs ended after 18 months. 
Notwithstanding these important caveats, the report is timely in two principal ways. Firstly, 
it represents one of the most comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the rent accounts 
of social housing landlords in this country. Secondly, with the roll-out of UC beginning to 
gain momentum, its indings should be of interest to a range of stakeholders including 
government, regulators of social housing in this country, social housing landlords, lenders, 
support agencies, and tenants.
The report is divided into four chapters, including this one. Chapter 2 examines the approach 
taken to the 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise. Chapter 3 presents the key 
indings to emerge from the exercise, and like Chapter 2, is arranged around a series of 
key questions. The last chapter highlights the key implications for policy to emerge from the 
research.
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2 Approach to the 18 months’ 
Rent Account Analysis 
exercise
2.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the study team’s approach to the 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis 
(RAA). It begins by exploring its analytical approach and then moves on to examine the data 
it analysed, how it derived the tenant samples that provide the basis for the analysis, and the 
analytical tools it used. It concludes by offering deinitions of the key terms and constructs 
used in the report.
2.2 What is the purpose of the exercise?
In line with the previous RAA exercise, the primary purpose of the 18 months’ one was to 
assess the impact of direct payment on landlord cash low and their inancial sustainability. 
Speciically, the analysis provides answers to a number of questions including:
• what was the impact of direct payment on the amount of rent arrears?
• what was the impact of direct payment on the number of tenants entering into arrears?
• what was the impact of direct payment on rent arrears recovery and rent collection costs?
• what was the impact of direct payment on the overall inancial sustainability of landlords?
2.3 What is the study team’s analytical approach 
to the exercise?
In line with the recommended guidance on impact evaluation, the study team adopted a 
quasi-experimental approach to assessing the impact of direct payment through RAA. This 
involved comparing the behaviour of Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP) tenants 
with those of a comparator sample of tenants with similar characteristics who were not in the 
DPDP programme.
2.4  What data has been used in the analysis?
An extensive consultation exercise was undertaken with Project Areas to establish what data 
would be included in the RAA exercises. It was agreed the following data would be included:13
13 It is important to note that the response for one research question – ‘What is the impact 
of direct payment on rent arrears recovery and rent collection costs?’ – was not 
secured through the rent account analysis exercise. Instead, it was generated through 
in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in Project Areas, with most of it being 
qualitative in nature.
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• direct payment monitoring data, such as whether a tenant had reached a trigger point or 
been switched back;
• rent account data, including: opening and closing balances; weekly information on rents, 
service charges, rent payments, third party payments; and methods of rent payment;
• Housing Beneit (HB) data, including: the amount received each period; the destination of 
payment; payment error; the duration of claims; eligible rent; entitlement amount; and the 
value of additional discretionary payments;
• data relating to the characteristics and circumstances of tenants, speciically their: age; 
household composition; work status; tenancy status (i.e. whether the tenancy is single 
or joint); length of residence in their current property; and housing history (i.e. whether 
they had moved in recent times). Data on their property (property type and number of 
bedrooms) and their eviction status (i.e. whether they were subject to eviction process) 
were also included within the analysis.
This data was compiled at the individual tenant level. The resulting dataset enabled the RAA 
to respond to the research questions outlined earlier by allowing assessment of:
• individual level change: what has happened to individual tenant rent account behaviours?
• overall change and impact, by summing across individual tenants;
• sub-group analysis in relation to a range of factors which may inluence payment 
behaviours or impact, such as: payment method; household composition; work status; HB 
status (i.e. whether tenants were in receipt of full or partial HB);
• if (and how) tenant behaviour and payment patterns vary over time;
• the impact of other factors (such as the Beneit Cap, the Removal of the Spare Room 
Subsidy (RSRS) and Discretionary Housing Payments).
2.5 How was the DPDP sample put together? And 
what does it look like? 
Project Areas were asked to provide data for all their tenants who were, or had been, on direct 
payment as part of the DPDP programme – tenants with no experience of direct payment were 
not included in the sample (and analysis). The direct payment sample included tenants for 
which the projects provided both rent account and HB data in at least one rent account period 
and for whom there was some activity on their rent account.14
As Table 2.1 reveals, 7,252 tenants were identiied as having been paid their Housing Beneit 
direct. This compares with the total included in the Direct Payment Demonstration Project: 
Learning and Payment Figures15 note released by the Department for Work and Pensions 




Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 
Key indings of the 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise
(DWP) in May 2013, which stated that 7,426 tenants had been paid in this way.16 As 
highlighted in Table 2.1, relecting the numbers of tenants ‘in scope’, the sample size varied 
between Project Areas.
Table 2.1 Number of records by area 
 Direct payment Comparator
sample sample
Edinburgh 909 666
Dunedin Canmore 909 0
Port of Leith 0 666
Oxford 1,968 1,129
GreenSquare 373 0





Wrekin Housing Trust 85 0
Southwark 1,302 1,042
Family Mosaic 374 0
Southwark 928 1,042
Torfaen 1,058 1,014
Bron Afon 963 1,014
Charter 95 0
Wakefield 977 1,090
Wakefield and District Housing 977 1,090
Total 7,252 4,941
Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise.
Base: All tenants; see table.
2.6 Why use a comparator sample?
The comparator sample has been used to improve the measurement of the impact of direct 
payment on the rent payment behaviours of tenants. In doing so, it provides a benchmark of 
what might have happened in the absence of direct payment.
16 The difference in these igures can be attributed to the effect of the data cleaning 
exercise undertaken by the study team on its DPDP sample – it removed tenant 
accounts that were incomplete because no HB or rent account data was provided. 
These records are assumed to be missing at random: there is no evidence to suggest 
that their absence would have led to systematic bias in the results (either over or 
underestimating the overall effect).
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2.7 How was the comparator sample generated?
Comparator data were provided by four Demonstration Project landlords: Oxford City 
Council, Southwark Council, Bron Afon in Torfaen and Wakeield and District Housing. In 
addition, Port of Leith,17 which was not part of the Demonstration Project, agreed to provide a 
comparator sample drawn from their tenants for Dunedin Canmore in the Edinburgh project. 
In total, data for 9,111 comparator tenants were provided. It was not possible to obtain 
comparator data for Shropshire because all of the tenants of the landlord that contributed 
most tenants to the programme in the area – Shropshire Council – were included in the 
DPDP programme. A comparator sample for Shropshire was therefore derived from the 
samples provided by other Project Areas. 
When using comparator samples it is imperative that their characteristics are as similar as 
possible to the target sample, in this case DPDP tenants. Therefore, Project Areas were 
instructed to provide samples that were consistent with this objective. The suitability of the 
comparator sample was improved by using the data matching technique, propensity score 
matching,18 which matched tenants in the two samples in relation to a number of attributes, 
which are listed in Section 2.8. Employing this technique resulted in the removal of some 
tenants19 from the comparator sample with 4,941 tenants being used in the analysis, as 
Table 2.1 reveals. 
2.8 How similar are the characteristics of tenants 
in the comparator and DPDP samples? 
As a result of the astute selection of the comparator samples by the Project Areas and 
the employment of propensity score matching, the samples are very similar, as Table 2.2 
illustrates. Speciically, they are similar in relation to the attributes used to propensity score 
match: rent account balance; proportion of rent covered by HB; rent level; age; household 
size/composition; work status; property size; and HB receipt and duration of entitlement. 
Quite intentionally, and consistent with impact evaluation guidance, the comparator sample 
does include tenants on full HB who, as a result, cannot fall into arrears, unlike their 
counterparts in the DPDP sample.
17 Port of Leith was approached as they were known to have a similar proile of tenants 
and housing stock to Dunedin Canmore in the City of Edinburgh.
18 See endnote vii for further information about propensity score matching.
19 That is, those tenants whose characteristics did not match those of tenants from the 
direct payment sample.
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Table 2.2 Comparison of direct payment and comparator samples on key characteristics
 Sample




Rent account balance relative to rent
More than one period worth of arrears 9 10
Between one period worth of arrears and credit 88 86
More than one period worth of credit 3 3
Full or partial HB
Full 73 73
Partial 27 27
Duration of current HB claim
0 – 1 years 25 30
2 – 4 years 31 28
5 – 9 years 35 34
10 years and over 9 9
Age of lead claimant
16 – 24 6 6
25 – 34 22 22
35 – 44 27 26
45 – 54 30 31
Over 55 14 14
Household composition
Couple 5 4
Couple with ‘dependents’ 13 13
Single person 36 38
Lone parent 32 32





0 or 1 23 24
2 36 37
3 35 35
4 or more 5 5
Claimant hours of work per week
None 79 78
Less than 16 2 2
16-30 15 15
30 or more 3 4
Partner hours of work per week
None/no partner 96 96
Less than 16 0 0
16-30 2 2
30 or more 2 1
Unweighted base 7,252 4,941
Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise.
Base: All tenants; see table.
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2.9 What do the samples look like when they are 
disaggregated to the area level?
Table 2.3 proiles the characteristics of residents in the direct payment sample at the area 
level (please use Table 2.2 to see how the direct payment sample compares with the 
comparator sample). This information is important as it may help explain any geographical 
differences in the indings presented in the next chapter. The emphasis on ‘may’ is important 
because there may be a range of other explanatory factors including: 
• ‘other’ characteristics of tenants, such as their income level, education, socio-economic 
grouping, and inancial capabilities;
• the socio-economic and physical attributes of the neighbourhoods tenants live in;
• the quality of the civic and support infrastructure within neighbourhoods;
• the housing context within them; and
• the approach taken to direct payment and housing management more broadly by 
landlords.
Notwithstanding this important caveat, the area proiles should be read alongside the 
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Rent account balance relative to rent
More than one period worth of arrears 4 9 6 19 10 6 9
Between one period worth of arrears and credit 91 88 92 77 88 93 88
More than one period worth of credit 5 3 3 4 2 1 3
Full or partial HB
Full 79 69 72 72 76 73 73
Partial 21 31 28 28 24 27 27
Duration of current HB claim
0 – 1 years 32 28 26 19 19 30 25
2 – 4 years 29 32 38 25 30 31 31
5 – 9 years 40 25 37 56 22 39 35
10 years and over 0 16 0 0 29 0 9
Age of lead claimant
16 – 24 5 6 7 5 6 11 6
25 – 34 16 24 21 23 23 24 22
35 – 44 28 28 29 30 22 23 27
45 – 54 35 31 27 28 31 29 30
Over 55 16 12 15 14 17 13 14
Household composition
Couple 5 3 7 2 9 7 5
Couple with dependants 6 16 16 9 15 16 13
Single person 64 28 33 34 34 31 36
Lone parent 19 37 30 38 26 32 32















































No 88 76 73 85 70 72 77
Yes 12 24 27 15 30 28 23
Bedrooms
0 or 1 51 21 15 30 14 9 23
2 30 39 42 35 34 35 36
3 14 35 40 25 48 51 35
4 or more 4 4 3 10 4 5 5
Claimant hours of work per week
None 83 76 79 74 85 81 79
Less than 16 2 3 2 4 2 2 2
16-30 12 18 15 17 11 14 15
30 or more 2 3 4 6 2 2 3
Partner hours of work per week
None/no partner 98 94 95 98 95 96 96
Less than 16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
16-30 1 2 3 1 2 2 2
30 or more 0 3 2 1 2 1 2
Ever paid part/all using Direct Debit
Yes 44 73(a) 58 22 16 59 41
No 56 27(a) 42 78 84 41 59
Unweighted number 909 1,968 1,038 1,302 1,058 977 7,252
a) Note this only included GreenSquare tenants.
Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise.
Base: All tenants; see table.
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2.10 Overall, how useful is the comparator 
sample?
Because of the similarity of the two samples, and its relatively large size, the comparator 
sample is very useful and provides a robust benchmark (and counterfactual) against which to 
assess the impact of direct payment on DPDP tenants. 
2.11 What analysis has the study team 
undertaken?
The study team have employed a range of descriptive, econometric and accounting 
techniques to explore the data. These include: cross-sectional modelling techniques, such as 
logistic regression, and longitudinal modelling techniques.20 
2.12 How transferrable are the indings to emerge 
from the analysis?
The indings have been derived from a programme which is in many ways unique and unlikely 
to be repeated – Universal Credit (UC) will be very different to the DPDP. Furthermore, 
the programme only involved a relatively small number of landlords: 12. These factors, of 
course, place a check on the transferability of the report’s indings: the indings hold for the 
12 participating landlords and may not be representative of what would happen nationally or 
for other tenant populations. However, it is also important to note that there are a number of 
other factors which enhance their transferability: direct payment is one of the central tenets of 
UC; all types of social housing landlords were represented in the DPDP programme; and, the 
(relatively) large number of tenants included in the programme. 
2.13 What are the key terms and concepts used in 
the analysis?
For people not familiar with the workings of rent accounts, the language associated with 
them may appear inaccessible and confusing. With this in mind, it is perhaps useful here to 
provide deinitions of some of the key terms used in this report, noting that, for reasons of 
accessibility, we have adopted a ‘looser’ interpretation of some of them:
• Rent owed. For the purpose of this research, rent owed is an all-encompassing term 
covering all debits – rent and service charges21 – going onto rent accounts.
20 The technical endnotes provide further information about analytical methods.
21 Service charges are payments for, or towards, services or facilities for use or beneit of 
the tenants. Some of these charges, such as maintenance of communal grounds, 
cleaning of external windows, secure building access may be covered by Housing 
Beneit. In some instances service charges are monies collected by landlords on behalf 
of other companies for things such as: insurance, heating, lighting and hot water for the 
tenant’s accommodation.
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• Payments. This represents all credits – rent payments and third party payments, such as 
water bills – to rent accounts.
• Rent arrears. Rent arrears are accrued when rent payments over a given period are less 
than the rent owed. 
• Rent payment periods (RPPs). RPPs are a construct devised by the study team 
to facilitate its analysis. They comprise four-week periods, or a month in the case of 
Edinburgh, over which landlords would expect tenant rent accounts to balance. 
• Rate of payment (ROP) per rent payment period. ROP is the rate of period rent 
payments to rent owed with the value indicating the percentage of debits accounted for by 
credits in the period. If in an RPP payments equal rent owed then the tenant has not over 
or underpaid. In order to make the analysis as digestible as possible, we have presented 
the ROP as a rate. In this context: 
 – a ROP of one implies the value of additional rent owed on the account in the period 
equals the value of rent paid: payments cover all rent owed. So if a tenant owed £100 
worth of additional rent in a period he/she had paid £100;22 
 – if the ROP is greater than one, tenants have paid more than the additional rent owed 
onto their rent accounts: for every £1 of new rent owed more than £1 in payments was 
received. Thus, if the ROP is 1.2 a tenant will have paid £1.20 for every £1 of additional 
rent owed, representing, when scaled-up, £120 of rent payments over an RPP when 
£100 was due;23
 – if the ROP is less than one, tenants have paid less than the rent owed: for every £1 of 
rent owed less than £1 in payments was received. So if the rate is 0.8 a tenant has paid 
80 pence for every £1 of additional rent owed, representing, when scaled-up, £80 of rent 
payments over an RPP when £100 was due.
• Rebasing. This technique allows the study team to factor into its analysis the important 
fact that tenants were moved onto the DPDP at different times through a phased process, 
which makes disentangling the impact of DP over time more dificult. For example, 
assessment of the impact of direct payment on tenants at Christmas 2012 would include 
tenants who had been on direct payment for as little as a month and as long as six 
months. Without rebasing, differences in the experiences of these tenants would be lost in 
the analysis. Thus, where appropriate, the data for questions has been reconigured – or 
rebased – so that tenants’ direct payment journeys start from the same departure point. 
However, it is important to note that rebasing does not fully account for any improvement 
in landlord processes improving over time.
22 Please note tenants may underpay in a given period because their account is in credit 
(i.e. has a positive balance) – the effect of this on the measurement of impact is 
controlled for through the use of the comparator sample.
23 Please note tenants may over pay in a given period to repay standing arrears on their 
account – again, the effect of this on the measurement of impact is controlled for 
through the use of the comparator sample.
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3 Findings
This chapter presents the indings from analysis of tenants’ rent accounts over the full 
18 months of the Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP). It updates the results 
of analysis at the end of the irst year of the DPDP (see Direct Payment Demonstration 
Projects: Key indings of the 12 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise, DWP Research 
Report No. 879), as well as offering irmer conclusions on some issues that could only 
be explored tentatively at that time. Patterns and trajectories are easier to discern over 
an 18-month, rather than 12-month timeframe and, for this reason, the extension of the 
DPDP from one year to 18 months has increased conidence in the conclusions drawn from 
analysis of tenants’ rent accounts.
The chapter is conigured around a series of key questions, the answers to which provide 
insight into the impact of direct payment on social landlords’ inancial viability in terms of 
the proportion of rent recovered during this period. It also tells us something about payment 
patterns and the characteristics of those apparently most at risk of accruing arrears as a 
result of direct payment. A series of technical endnotes provide additional information about 
analytical methods, robustness and the detail of some indings.
3.1 Overview of key indings
When the DPDP programme was conceived there was concern that the rent arrears of 
participating landlords would increase very dramatically. This did not happen - there was a 
consensus amongst local stakeholders and lenders that they had not increased as much as 
had been anticipated. Direct Payment in the DPDP did have a inancial impact on landlords 
and tenants but much of this burden was borne in the irst few periods following migration. 
In fact, nearly half of the total difference between rent collected and rent owed accrued 
during the 18 months of the DPDP were accrued in the irst month/four-week period following 
migration. By the end of the 18 months of the programme: rent payment rates amongst 
tenants who had been on direct payment for the duration were 2.2 percentage points lower 
than amongst a comparator sample of tenants not on direct payment; and the net additional 
impact of direct payment in these later payment periods was 2.1 percentage points less 
rent paid than if direct payment had not been introduced. A clear picture emerged, then, of 
a distinct and signiicant drop in rent payment rates when tenants irst migrated to direct 
payment. Payment rates then improved dramatically over time, stabilising at slightly below 
both baseline and comparator rates. These results point clearly to the need for mitigating 
action during the transition to direct payment, whether in the form of support to tenants, close 
monitoring of rent accounts, cautious assessments of tenants’ readiness for direct payment, 
ongoing support assessment processes or other intervention. Improving payment rates 
during tenants’ irst three payments would reduce the negative impact of direct payments on 
tenants and on landlords’ income signiicantly.
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Q1. What proportion of the rent owed by tenants on direct payment in  
 the DPDP was paid? 
Tenants who went onto direct payment during the DPDP paid 95.5 per cent of all the rent 
owed24 from that point onwards.25 4.5 per cent of rent owed was, therefore, not collected, 
amounting to £1.9 million.26 This includes tenants who switched back27 to landlord payment 
(i.e. stopped receiving their HB directly) or stopped receiving Housing Beneit and so the 
results show the combined effect of receiving direct payments and the switchback process on 
payment.28 If we remove tenants from the analysis while they were switched back, and count 
only rent owed and paid while they were receiving HB directly, 94.7 per cent of rent was paid. 
Using this calculation, over the 18 months 5.3 per cent of rent owed was not collected.29 Rent 
collection rates are therefore lower without the effect of a switchback mechanism, suggesting 
that switchbacks do help suppress the amount of rent which is not collected.
Tenants in the comparator sample, none of whom received direct payment, paid 99.1 per 
cent of their rent over the same periods. Their rent not paid amounted to 0.9 per cent of 
rent charged.30 Direct payment tenants therefore paid 3.6 percentage points less rent than 
the comparator sample (or 4.4 percentage points less rent if tenants are excluded from the 
analysis once they switch back) over the 18 months of the DPDP.
24 For the purposes of this report, the term ‘rent owed’ refers to the debits charged to 
tenants’ rent accounts during the period.
25 Some tenants went onto direct payment in June 2012, some in July 2012, some in 
August 2012 and so on. For the purposes of this analysis tenants are only included 
once they start to receive direct payment and not before. The number of rent payments 
due during the irst year of the DPDP therefore varied depending on when a tenant was 
irst put onto direct payment.
26 Note these igures include overpayments. Excluding overpayments the sum of 
individual DPDP tenant’s arrears was £2.3 million: 5.6 per cent of rent owed.
27 Project Areas were testing different switchback triggers. Some Project Areas switched 
tenants back to landlord payment once they had accrued four weeks’/one month’s 
arrears, some eight weeks arrears and one Project Area switched tenants back after 12 
weeks’ arrears had accrued. The trigger level therefore affects the amount of arrears 
that can accrue. Under UC the trigger level is two months and so tenants will not have 
the opportunity to accrue 12 weeks’ arrears, nor will they be switched back once they 
accrue four weeks’ arrears.
28 Tenants who switched back could only accrue further arrears if they were in receipt of 
partial rather than full HB, and many will have had a repayment plan in place 
subsequently, both of which would have affected rent payment levels following switch 
back. This igure is, therefore, skewed slightly by the switchback mechanism. Some 
tenants, for some of the time, could not have underpaid because their HB went direct to 
their landlord during the time they were switched back.
29 Note these igures include overpayments. Excluding overpayments the sum of 
individual DPDP tenant’s arrears whilst they received DP was £2.1 million: 6.5 per cent 
of rent owed.
30 Excluding overpayments the sum of individual comparator tenant’s arrears was £1.0 
million: 2.5 per cent of rent owed.
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However, this overall picture masks signiicant shifts over time, with rent payment rates 
improving markedly after the irst few direct payments of HB. In payment period 1,31 for 
example, 67 per cent of rent owed was paid but by payment period 18, the payment rate of 
direct payment tenants was 99 per cent.32
Tenants in the DPDP were staggered onto direct payment so that some received their 
irst payment in June 2012, some in July 2012, some in August 2012 and so on. In June 
2013, when the DPDP was scheduled to end, a decision was taken to extend for a further 
six months. Some Project Areas brought additional tenants into scope during this period, 
resulting in a further 413 tenants being put onto direct payment.33 For the purposes of this 
analysis, the data were rebased so that ‘rent payment period 1’ represents the rent period 
following a tenant’s irst direct payment, regardless of the calendar month in which that 
payment was made.34
Figure 3.1 presents average rent payment rates for each payment period (including the six 
payment periods prior to tenants receiving their irst direct payment). It shows that, following 
the sharp reduction in rent payment rates in period 1 (to 67p per £1 of rent), payment rates 
increased in periods 2 and 3 but remained below baseline and comparator levels. After 
period 3, average rent payment rates were typically between 1 and 5 pence less rent paid 
per £1 of rent charged than the comparator sample. The main exceptions were the eighth 
and 17th direct payment periods, when payment rates exceeded that for the comparator 
sample, before falling back.
The sharp reduction in payment rates in period 1 is relected in the total value of rent not 
collected when tenants irst move onto direct payment (£1.9m – see above). Just under half 
of the shortfall in rent paid (48 per cent) accrued in the irst payment period35 and 65 per cent 
of the total value of rent not paid accrued in tenants’ irst three payment periods.36 In total, 461 
tenants recorded in the RAA data were switched back during the irst three payment periods, 
just under a third of all tenants who switched back during the course of the DPDP.
31 ‘Payment periods’ also referred to as ‘rent payment periods’ are a construct devised by 
the study team to facilitate analysis. They comprise four-week periods, or a month in the 
case of Edinburgh, over which landlords would expect tenant rent accounts to balance. 
All Project Areas except Edinburgh paid HB every four weeks. In Edinburgh payments 
were made every calendar month. ‘Rent payment period’ 1 would therefore refer to 
the rent cycle (i.e. the period for which rent is due) following direct payment of the irst 
four weeks HB (the irst month in Edinburgh). Payment period 2 refers to the rent cycle 
following HB payment for weeks 4-8 (the second month in Edinburgh) and so on.
32 This is based on rent account data for 1,890 tenants. the remainder of direct payment 
tenants received fewer than 18 direct payments of HB.
33 A slightly higher number of tenants were put onto direct payment in the DPDP 
extension period but the evaluation team were provided with data for 413 tenants.
34 Rebasing to a common baseline allows analysis of impact by duration of time on direct 
payment. It also prevents estimates of impact on payment periods being skewed 
because of the length of time on direct payment.
35 Forty-three per cent of the total sum of individual tenants’ arrears on DPDP accrued in 
the irst period.
36 Sixty-one per cent of the total sum of individual tenants’ arrears on DPDP accrued in 
the irst three periods.
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Oxford, Torfaen and Wakeield recorded the highest overall payment rate (97 per cent), 
while Shropshire and Southwark recorded the lowest overall payment rate (92 per cent and 
94 per cent respectively). Local authority landlords recorded slightly lower overall payment 
rates than HA or LSVT landlords (94 per cent compared to 97 per cent). (See Table A.1). The 
payment trajectory over time was broadly replicated across the six demonstration areas. The 
period 1 rental payment rate drop was greatest in Shropshire and Oxford, where payment 
rates fell to 48 and 52 per cent, respectively. Oxford did encounter some administrative 
problems which may help explain the lower rental payment rate there.
The overall arrears picture has improved since the last phase of analysis, undertaken 
12 months into the DPDP. After 12 months, tenants who received direct payment at some point 
during that period had paid 94.3 per cent of all the rent owed, while the comparator sample had 
paid almost 100 per cent of their rent owed (a difference of 5.7 percentage points).


























Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: All tenants; DPDP (7,216-1,519); Comparator (4,908-1,372).
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Q2. What is the impact of the direct payment of HB on rent payment?
The fact that direct payment tenants failed to pay 4.5 percentage points worth of rent owed 
(see Question 1) does not tell us anything about the isolated impact of direct payment on 
rent payment. We can only determine the additional impact of direct payment by comparing 
the rent payment rates of direct payment tenants with those in a comparator sample37 using 
statistical modelling.38
This analysis reveals that, on average, tenants receiving direct payment of HB paid 5.5 
percentage points less rent per payment period (5.5 pence for every £1 of rent owed) during 
the 18 month period, than they would have done had their HB had been paid direct to their 
landlord. It is important to stress that this impact is additional, over-and-above what would 
have happened with landlord payment. 
The impact of direct payments did, however, lessen signiicantly over time. In the irst three 
rent payment periods (a total period of approximately 12 weeks) after being put onto direct 
payment,39 tenants paid on average 15.7 percentage points less rent per payment period 
than they would have done had direct payment not been introduced. By payment periods 
4-6 this igure had fallen dramatically to 2.8 percentage points with it falling again in payment 
periods 7-9 (1.3 percentage points less rent ). This remains consistent with the picture when 
the irst 12 months’ rent account data were analysed, raising the possibility of the trajectory 
continuing until direct payment had no impact at all. 
Analysis of the full 18 months of rent data shows that direct payment did continue to have an 
impact, even once tenants had been receiving their HB directly for a year or more, although 
the impact remained well below that of the irst three rent payment periods. Rent payment 
rates in the inal eight months of the DPDP were as follows: 
• rent payment periods 10-12 (the point at which the 12-month analysis was completed): 
2.2 percentage points less rent;
• rent payment periods 13-15: 3.5 percentage points less rent;
• rent payment periods 16-18: 2.1 percentage points less rent.
It is important to reiterate that tenants’ rent payment periods do not all coincide. For example, 
rent payment period 1 is June 2012 for some tenants and January 2013 for others. For this 
analysis, then, luctuations are unlikely to be explained by seasonal or time speciic changes 
(RSRS for example).
37 See Chapter 2 for more details about how the comparator sample was derived and used.
38 Modelling controls for certain factors, such as the impact of the switchback mechanism 
and the RSRS.
39 Tenants in the DPDP were staggered onto direct payment so that some received their 
irst payment in June 2012, some in July 2012, some in August 2012 and so on. Where 
relevant, to remove potential bias created by the staggered start to the DPDP, the data 
were ‘rebased’ so that ‘payment period 1’ represents the rent period following a tenant’s 
irst direct payment, regardless of the calendar month in which that payment was made. 
Where the phrase ‘irst payment period after being transferred onto direct payment’ or 
similar is used, analysis will have been based on rebased data.
35
Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 
Key indings of the 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise
The impact of direct payment on rent payment rates varied by Project Area, with Wakeield 
and Torfaen recording the smallest impact and Southwark and Edinburgh the greatest 
impact. In terms of landlord type, Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) tenants witnessed 
the lowest impact of direct payment compared to housing association or local authority/
ALMO tenants. This helps explain the relatively low impact in the Wakeield and Torfaen 
project areas (the Wakeield Project areas comprised one LSVT landlord and in Torfaen the 
majority of tenants were provided by an LSVT landlord). The impact was greatest on housing 
association tenants. 
It is of interest that Southwark and Edinburgh – where the greatest impact was felt – 
operated triggers providing the highest level of safeguard (four weeks and one month 
respectively),40 suggesting that the trigger level is only part of the picture. The levels of non-
payment and underpayment will be a factor (for example, if a relatively high proportion of 
people fail to pay their rent, even if they are then removed from the programme, or there 
are a signiicant number of underpayers over time) as will the behaviour of the comparator 
sample. On the latter point, if, for example, there was an increase in the number of people in 
receipt of full HB in the comparator sample (and therefore unable to underpay) the difference 
between the DP sample and the comparator sample would have become greater. It may be 
relevant that in Southwark a relatively small proportion of tenants initially paid their rent by 
Direct Debit and that this payment method was found to positively affect payment rates (see 
Question 15).
Q3. What proportion of tenants in the DPDP accrued arrears after   
 moving onto direct payment?
Sixty-one per cent of tenants who received direct payments during the 18 months of the 
DPDP had not paid some or all of their rent owed: they had accrued arrears while on the 
programme.41 Counting only rent owed and paid in rent payment periods when rent was 
paid direct to the tenant, 65 per cent of tenants who received direct payments during the 18 
months of the DPDP had underpaid while on the programme. Over the same timeframe, 39 
per cent of the comparator sample, none of whom received direct payments, had accrued 
arrears.42 Of the direct payment tenants who had not accrued arrears by the end of DPDP, 
some had accrued, but repaid arrears at some point. In total, 88 per cent of direct payment 
tenants had accrued arrears at the end of a payment period compared with 76 per cent of 
the comparator sample.
40 Southwark shifted to a 4+4 model whereby tenants were effectively given four weeks to 
settle into the new system before applying the four-week switchback trigger. Some 
tenants may, therefore, have accrued eight weeks’ rent arrears before being switched 
back to landlord payment.
41 As with the analysis for Question 1, this includes tenants who went onto direct payment 
but switched back. After this point they could only accrue further arrears if they were on 
partial HB, having deductions made from their HB, or if HB did not cover their full rent 
liability for other reasons. Some will also have been repaying arrears via a repayment 
plan agreed with their landlord.
42 Tenants in the comparator sample were only able to accrue arrears if their HB did not 
cover all the rent owed (i.e. charges made to their account), for example, if they were 
on partial HB, or having deductions made from their HB, or if there HB did not cover 
their full rent liability for other reasons.
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An increase in the number of tenants underpaying (regardless of the value) can have 
implications for landlord collection and recovery costs: the greater the numbers of people in 
arrears, the more actions are required to recover those arrears.
There has been little change since the end of the irst year of DPDP when 61 per cent of 
direct payment tenants and 35 per cent of the comparator sample had not paid all of their 
rent since irst going on to direct payment. This could suggest that tenants are slow to repay 
arrears once accrued (see Question 12 below), or that tenants newly accruing arrears equal 
those repaying their arrears.
Analysis of the proportion of tenants underpaying over time, shows a marked spike similar to 
that described in Q1 and Q2 (see Figure 3.2). Fifty-nine per cent of direct payment tenants 
underpaid or did not pay their rent following their irst direct payment of HB, compared 
with only 26 per cent of tenants in the second payment period before moving onto direct 
payment.43 The proportion of tenants who underpaid or did not pay quickly returned to 
baseline levels in payment periods 2-4. In some payment periods, the proportion of tenants 
who underpaid their rent was lower than before the introduction of direct payment.
It is important to note here that although the proportion of tenants underpaying their rent 
reduced over time the composition of underpayment changed once direct payment was 
introduced and did not return to baseline levels. Figure 3.2 shows that, although the 
overall proportion of tenants underpaying or not-paying their rent changed little when direct 
payment was introduced (notwithstanding the spike in payment period 1), the composition of 
underpayment did change. In particular, the proportion of tenants who failed to pay 50-100 
per cent of their rent was higher under direct payment. This explains how the total value of 
arrears can continue to increase, even though the overall proportion of tenants underpaying 
changed little after period 1.
This is not surprising: pre-direct payment, only those eligible for a small amount of HB 
could underpay signiicantly and no tenants could fail to pay altogether other than through 
administrative error. It does raise issues, however, because signiicant underpayment/non-
payment has a far greater effect on landlord income streams than underpayment by a small 
amount.
43 The comparison is made with the second period before transferring onto direct 
payments because payment behaviours in the irst period before direct payment appear 
to have been affected by the transition.
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Figure 3.2 Proportion of direct payment tenants underpaying by payment period: 
rebased
A higher proportion of local authority tenants had not paid all of their rent due by the end 
of the DPDP than LSVT or HA tenants (72 per cent compared with 55 per cent and 53 per 
cent). Shropshire witnessed the highest proportion of tenants underpaying (70 per cent) and 
Edinburgh the lowest (54 per cent). (See Table A.2)
Q4. What is the impact of direct payment on the proportion of tenants  
 failing to pay some or all of their rent?
Direct payment increased the likelihood of tenants underpaying in a given rent payment 
period by an average of ive per cent. This is on top of the base average likelihood of tenants 
on landlord payment underpaying. Exploring this in more detail reveals that the likelihood of 
tenants underpaying their rent by a small amount increased negligibly, whereas the likelihood 
of tenants underpaying by large amount increased markedly. For example: tenants on direct 
payment were just under 1.3 times as likely to underpay by ive per cent or more but eight 
and a half times more likely to underpay by 75 per cent or more.
Over time, however, the impact of DP on the likelihood of tenants underpaying, even by a 
large amount, reduced signiicantly. For example, tenants on direct payment were 16 times 
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Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: All tenants; DPDP (7,216-1,890).
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periods but by their 16th payment44 tenants were just ive times more likely to underpay by 
75 per cent or more. 
The overall picture has improved since the last phase of analysis, undertaken 12 months into 
the DPDP, at which point direct payment of HB was associated with an 11 per cent (rather 
than ive per cent) average increase in the likelihood of underpaying in a given rent payment 
period. The reduction in impact is due to a greater proportion of tenants being on DP for 
longer (length of time on DP is associated with reduced impact, further reinforcing the overall 
picture of markedly improved payment rates over time), thus weighting the average impact 
downwards. 
The impact of direct payment on rent payment rates varied by project area and landlord type:
• impact was greatest in Edinburgh and Torfaen; and least in Shropshire, Southwark and 
Oxford;
• impact was greatest for HA tenants and least for LSVT tenants.
Q5. We know that tenants are more prone to accruing arrears when they 
 irst go onto direct payment (see Questions 1-4). But did this  
 change over the course of the Demonstration Project as the   
 programme developed and learning accrued?
The ‘arrears spike’ which emerged at the start of the DPDP cannot be explained just with 
reference to the infancy of DPDP and the experimental nature of early implementation. 
Tenants who went onto direct payment later in the DPDP, once learning had accrued and 
processes adapted accordingly, still displayed relatively low irst payment rates. An arrears 
spike is less pronounced, but still evident.
Analysis thus far has revealed a distinct ‘arrears spike’ in rent payment periods 1-3, 
suggesting that the shift from one system of HB to another may be a critical point for tenants 
and landlords. However, it is not clear from these results alone whether the trajectory relects 
inherent challenges associated with moving tenants onto the new system and so is a pattern 
likely to persist, or relects the infancy of direct payment as a policy when the DPDP went 
live, in which case it may not. 
The sharp reduction in rent payment rates in period 1, and the arrears spike over payment 
period 1-3, could indicate inherent challenges associated with moving from one HB system 
to another – a period of transition during which tenants acclimatise to the new system and 
learn to manage direct payment. If so, landlords may want to closely monitor tenant rent 
accounts during this period and the need for a programme of transitional support for tenants 
is indicated. 
44 Although a small sample drawn mostly from the same Project Area (Oxford), these 
tenants were not part of the original cohort of 2,000 tenants selected in each Project 
Area to participate in the DPDP, which makes for a better comparator. Tenants who 
went onto direct payment later in the DPDP but who were part of the original DPDP 
sample would have been subject to some of the same processes as those who 
transferred earlier (for examples methods of communicating the changes, support 
assessment processes). In addition, the reasons for later transfer onto direct payment 
amongst this cohort may have relected issues potentially impacting on likely payment 
rates such as reluctance to engage, or higher support needs.
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On the other hand, in the irst few months of the DPDP, when the majority of direct payment 
recipients were irst transferred to the new system, Project Areas and the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) had not yet accrued any learning, and new systems and processes 
were being trialled and tested. The early arrears spike may, therefore, be attributable to the 
experimental nature of early implementation and with factors speciic to the DPDP (i.e. processes 
and systems employed which will not be rolled out) or which can be rectiied based on learning 
accrued. These include: 
• technical and administrative errors when collecting rent, for example, incorrect bank 
account numbers (incorrectly provided by the tenant and/or incorrectly entered by the 
landlord). To varying degrees, Project Areas encountered early problems in this regard and 
learnt lessons from this irst payment period that they sought to rectify in future periods;
• Housing Beneit payment errors such as late payment or payment to the wrong bank 
account. Again, early problems were identiied and rectiied;
• the support assessment process initially used by Project Areas to identify those who should 
be safeguarded was found to be generally ineffective, but was also designed to safeguard 
only a small proportion of tenants. Thinking has since shifted and safeguarding processes 
and criteria have developed, partly as a result of learning from the DPDP. Tenants who, 
under the current Universal Credit (UC) system would not be considered ready for direct 
payment, were included in the early phases of the DPDP (with some quickly accruing arrears 
and switching back). Different claimant assessment processes and higher numbers of 
tenants being safeguarded going forward will reduce the ‘spike’ in periods 1-3.
We can cast further light on this issue by comparing the payment rates of tenants who 
transferred onto direct payment early in the DPDP with those who went onto direct payment 
later in the programme, when lessons had been learnt and systems and processes adapted 
accordingly. This is achieved in two ways:
• comparing the ‘payment period 1’ payment rate of tenants who were transferred onto direct 
payment in the irst few months of the DPDP with those who went onto direct payment 
subsequently;
• comparing the payment rates of the 413 tenants who were brought into scope following 
the decision to extend the DPDP for a further six months45, with those of the irst cohort 
selected in 2012. The process of communicating the changes to these tenants, assessing 
their readiness for direct payment, and engaging with them only began towards the end of 
the irst year of the DPDP. Project Areas were therefore able to apply the learning accrued 
in the irst year of the DPDP to early implementation with these tenants.
The results of this analysis show that tenants put onto direct payment a little later in the 
DPDP did pay more of their rent in payment period 146 than those who went onto direct 
45 Although a small sample drawn mostly from the same Project Area (Oxford), these 
tenants were not part of the original cohort of 2,000 tenants selected in each Project 
Area to participate in the DPDP, which makes for a better comparator. Tenants who 
went onto direct payment later in the DPDP but who were part of the original DPDP 
sample would have been subject to some of the same processes as those who 
transferred earlier (for examples methods of communicating the changes, support 
assessment processes). In addition, the reasons for later transfer onto direct payment 
amongst this cohort may have relected issues potentially impacting on likely payment 
rates such as reluctance to engage, or higher support needs.
46 As in previous questions, ‘payment period 1’ is used here to represents the rent period 
following a tenants’ irst direct payment, regardless of the calendar month in which that 
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Overall payment rate: Period 1
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants whose first direct payment was in the stage; DPDP (3,631-228).
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payment in the irst two periods of the programme. Figure 3.3 presents the average irst 
payment rate of tenants transferring onto direct payment in every ‘stage’47 of the DPDP in 
which at least 100 tenants received direct payment for the irst time. It shows that tenants 
who transferred onto direct payment in stages 1 and 2 of the DPDP (June and July 2012 
in most Project Areas) recorded broadly similar irst payment rates: 62 per cent. The 
irst payment rate of tenants starting in stages 3 through to 5 were markedly higher, and 
increased stage on stage. Those starting in stage ive, for example, paid 88 per cent of their 
rent in their irst rent payment period.
However, with the exception of the inal stage of the DPDP, lower irst payment rates were 
recorded by tenants who transferred onto direct payment in later stages: 54 per cent in stage six, 
68 per cent in stage seven, 47 per cent in stage eight and 36 per cent in stage 15 of the DPDP. 
Figure 3.3 Period 1 payment rates for tenants on direct payment; rebased48
47 ‘Stage 1’ refers to the irst direct payment of HB made by Project Areas, which in most 
Project Areas was made in late June 2012, Stage 2 to the second payment four weeks 
later (or one month later in Edinburgh) and so on. The Edinburgh demonstration project 
made the irst payment slightly later, in August 2012 and then every month, rather than 
every four weeks.
48 Only stages where at least where at least 100 tenants irst received direct payment 
were included in the analysis.
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These results suggest that the ‘arrears spike’ which emerged at the start of the DPDP cannot 
be explained just with reference to the infancy of DPDP and the experimental nature of early 
implementation. 
Comparison between irst payment rates of the original cohort of DPDP tenants and those 
brought into scope in the extension period corroborates this further. Comparing the average 
irst payment rate (i.e. the irst rent payment following the irst direct payment of HB) for 
tenants who were brought into scope in the extension period (the inal six months of the 
DPDP) against that of the original cohort of DPDP tenants shows that: 
• tenants brought into scope during the DPDP extension did have a higher average irst 
period payment rate than those in scope in the irst 12 months, but it remained relatively 
low: 77 per cent of rent owed was paid in payment period 1, compared with 67 per cent of 
the original cohort of DPDP tenants;
• in addition, the average irst payment rate amongst tenants brought into scope during the 
DPDP extension was less than the average irst payment rate for the original cohort of 
tenants who moved onto direct payment in stages 4 (0.84) and 5 (0.88) of the DPDP
The support assessment process initially used by Project Areas to identify tenants’ readiness 
for direct payment was not very effective and, relecting UC thinking at that time, was also 
designed to safeguard only a small proportion of tenants. In addition, in some Project Areas 
support structures were not fully in place in the early stages of the DPDP. As a result, some 
tenants were put onto direct payment who would now be safeguarded and/or supported. 
Many of these quickly accrued arrears and switched back. This begs the question of how 
much of the arrears spike was attributable to these tenants – i.e. to people who, under the 
current direct payment/UC design, would not go onto direct payment or would be supported 
to do so? If a signiicant proportion of the arrears spike is attributable to these tenants then 
we would not expect the pattern to repeat going forward. 
We cannot test this precisely, but insight can be gleaned by removing from analysis all those 
tenants who switched back in their irst three payment periods, as a (imprecise) proxy for 
those who should not have gone onto direct payment. 
Excluding tenants from the analysis who switched back within their irst three payment 
periods gives the following results: 
• tenants paid 95.8 per cent of rent due, 4.2 per cent was not paid (compared with 95.5 per 
cent of rent due if early switchbacks are included – see Question 1)
• on average, tenants paid 5.0 percentage points less rent per payment period than they 
would have done had their HB had been paid direct to their landlord (compared with 5.5 
percentage points if early switchbacks are included – see Question 2)
• 61 per cent of tenants had not paid some or all of their rent by the end of the programme 
(no difference – see Question 3).
A similar picture emerges if tenants who switched back within their irst six payment periods 
are excluded from analysis.
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We can conidently conclude from these results that the ‘arrears spike’ was not driven 
primarily by factors speciic to the DPDP. Relatively low initial payment rates are likely to 
be a feature of the implementation of direct payment going forward unless mitigating action 
is taken. The spike may be less pronounced during roll out, relecting the inluence DPDP 
has had on UC design, but focused intervention during transition may be needed, for those 
currently on HB.49
Q6. If the ‘arrears spike’ in payment periods 1 to 3 could be mitigated,  
 what difference would this make to the impact of direct payment 
 on rent payment?
The particular low payment rates in the irst couple of months of the DPDP have the effect 
of depressing overall DPDP rent payment rates. This is not a ‘skewed’ picture – we saw 
in Question 5 that the payment trajectory seen in the DPDP could repeat going forward, 
although perhaps with higher initial payment rates. The obvious response to these results is 
to pay close attention to early implementation, perhaps offering intensive support, monitoring 
rent accounts, and making cautious assessments of vulnerability during the transition period. 
The question is, what effect might effective mitigating action have? Removing the irst three 
payment periods – i.e. the spike – from analysis sheds some light on the likely impact. 
If the irst three payment periods are removed from analysis (or the ‘arrears spike’ 
were completely mitigated going forward) the impact of direct payment reduces 
dramatically. For example:
• in total, tenants paid 97.9 per cent of the rent due from the fourth rent payment period 
onwards (including those who subsequently switched back).50 Overall the value of rent 
not paid to rent due therefore reduces from 4.5 per cent to 2.1 per cent if the irst three 
payment periods are removed from analysis. The comparator sample paid 98.8 per cent of 
rent from the fourth payment periods onwards (1.2 per cent of rent owed was not paid) and 
so direct payment tenants paid 0.9 per cent less rent than the comparator sample if 
the irst three payment periods are excluded;
• including only periods when DPDP tenants received a direct payment (i.e. excluding 
tenants during any periods in which they were switched back), rent collected was 97.7 per 
cent of rent due. Therefore the percentage not collected reduces from 5.3 per cent to 2.3 
per cent if the irst three payment periods are excluded. This represents 1.0 per cent less 
rent paid than the comparator sample from the fourth payment period onwards;
• 65 per cent of the total value of the shortfall in rent collected accrued during the DPDP 
accrued in the irst three rent payment periods (see Question 1) and so the total shortfall 
in rent collected reduces from £1.9 million to £648,000 if the irst three payment 
periods are removed from the analysis;51
• the estimated net additional impact of being on direct payment, i.e. over and above being 
on landlord payment, reduces from 5.5 percentage points less rent paid per payment 
period to 2.5 percentage points less rent paid per payment period;
49 All participating tenants in the DPDP were existing HB claimants rather than new 
claimants, who may respond differently to direct payment.
50 This analysis excludes tenants who were switched back permanently in the irst three 
periods on direct payment.
51 Excluding overpayments the total value of individual tenants’ arrears accrued on DPDP 
reduces from £2.3 million to £0.9 million.
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• discounting tenants’ irst three rent payment periods, 42 per cent of tenants had underpaid 
their rent (accrued arrears) while on the programme. This is only three percentage points 
higher than the comparator sample over the whole period. For only eight per cent of 
tenants were these arrears 15 per cent or greater of rent charged onto their accounts.
The results of this, albeit hypothetical, analysis underscores the importance of developing 
effective intervention to mitigate problems when tenants irst move onto direct payment. 
Q7. Did arrears accrue because a few people paid no rent, or because  
 lots of people underpaid?
Partial payment was much more common than non-payment in the DPDP. Tenants paying 
no rent formed a relatively small proportion of all those who accrued arrears – between 27 
per cent in the second rent payment period and 12 per cent in in the 17th and 18th payment 
periods. Across the inal six payment periods, non-payers averaged just 17 per cent of the 
sample of those who had underpaid their rent (see Figure 3.4). 
However, non-payment had a greater impact on the total value of arrears than partial payment. 
Although non-payers accounted for a relatively small proportion of those who underpaid their 
rent, they accounted for as much 50 per cent (in rent payment periods 2, 9, 11, 14 and 16) of 
the total value of the arrears. Across the inal six payment periods non-payment accounted for 
an average of 44 per cent of the total value of arrears (see Figure 3.5).
Q8. When tenants underpay52 their rent, do they underpay by a lot 
 or a little?
The proportion of tenants who underpaid their rent by a relatively large amount (i.e. by 
50-100 per cent of the rent due) increased with the introduction of direct payment. This is 
consistent with the indings from the irst 12 months of DPDP. 
Figure 3.4 shows that in the three payment periods prior to the introduction of direct payment 
this group (represented by the blue and red sections of the irst three columns) accounted for 
an average of 10 per cent of those who underpaid.53 For the 18 payment periods following 
the launch of the DPDP the proportion grew to an average of 39 per cent.54
However, Figure 3.4 also shows that underpaying by a relatively large amount was more 
prevalent in the early stages of the DPDP, particularly in payment period 1. This group 
constituted 69 per cent of all those who underpaid in payment period 1 (including non-
payers) but reduced to 39 per cent in payment period 6, 33 per cent in payment period 12, 
and 28 per cent in payment period 18.
52 In this report the term ‘underpayment’ refers to a failure to pay some or all of the rent 
owed and therefore includes non-payment as well as partial payment.
53 Prior to the introduction of direct payment non-payment could only occur as a result of 
administrative problems although signiicant underpayment would be possible amongst 
those on partial HB.
54 A series of switchback triggers operated in the Project Areas, designed speciically to 
remove tenants displaying particular payment patterns from remaining in the 
programme. This included triggers designed to switchback high value persistent 
underpayers, and triggers designed to switch back non-payers after a period of time. 
This will, therefore, have affected the patterns of underpayment which emerged. 
Chapter 1 provides further details about the switchback process and triggers.
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Looking in more detail at the payment patterns of tenants who underpaid further highlights 
this trajectory – over time the proile of tenants underpaying each period shifted, with a 
greater proportion underpaying by a smaller amount, perhaps indicating increased capacity 
to manage direct payment over time. For example:
• tenants underpaying by 50 per cent but less than 100 per cent accounted for 47 per cent 
of all those who underpaid in the irst period of the DPDP but averaged just 15 per cent 
between payment periods 12 and 18;
• the proportion of underpaying tenants who underpaid by a smaller amount (i.e. less 
than 15 per cent of the rent owed) increased from 17 per cent in payment period 1 to an 
average of 48 per cent between payment periods 12 and 18 (or a high of 54 per cent in 
payment period 17). 
Figure 3.4 Distribution of underpayers by category of underpayment
Improved patterns of underpayment over time is encouraging but it is worth noting that, 
despite this, in payment periods 12 to 18 the proportion of ‘underpayers’ who paid no rent or 
who underpaid by more than half the rent owed was still more than treble what it had been in 
the baseline payment period. 
A greater proportion of tenants underpaying by a large amount has implications for the 
distribution of underpayment by value and will affect the ways in which landlords manage 
underpayment by their tenants. They may, for example, choose to focus on those tenants 


























































































































No payment Underpaid by 50% but less than 100%
Underpaid by less than 15%Underpaid by 15-50%
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.

















































































































No payment Underpaid by 50% but less than 100%
Underpaid by less than 15%Underpaid by 15-50%
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants who underpaid; DPDP (4,231-413).
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Figure 3.5 presents the distribution of underpayment by value and shows that although non-
payers were smaller in number, non-payment had a more signiicant effect on the total value 
of the underpayment, while underpayment of less than 15 per cent had a more limited effect. 
Speciically:
• in the three payment periods prior to the start of direct payment, non-payment accounted 
for an average of eight per cent of the total value of underpayment. In the 18 payment 
periods following the start of direct payment this average igure increased to 46 per cent, 
remaining consistently above at least 37 per cent over the course of the DPDP, with peaks 
of 50 per cent or more in ive separate periods;
• in the three periods prior to the start of direct payment, underpayment by less than 15 
per cent accounted for an average of 22 per cent of the total value. However, in the 18 
payment periods following the start of direct payment, this igure decreased to an average 
of 6 per cent.
Non-payment of rent was, therefore, the most signiicant payment factor affecting the value 
of arrears.
Figure 3.5 Distribution of underpayment value by category of underpayment
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Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
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Q9. Is underpayment persistent or erratic? 
Examining rent payment patterns of tenants who received at least seven direct payments55 
reveals that tenants were more likely to underpay erratically than persistently. ‘Persistence’ 
has been deined as making a least three consecutive underpayments while in receipt of 
direct payment.
Nearly half (46 per cent) of all underpayers made no consecutive underpayments and 25 per 
cent of underpayers (23 per cent of all direct payment tenants) underpaid in two consecutive 
periods (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7). Those who underpaid in three or more consecutive 
periods comprised 29 per cent of all underpayers (27 per cent of all direct payment tenants) 
and Figure 3.7 shows that, of these:
• 15 per cent underpaid in three consecutive periods (14 per cent of all tenants);
• six per cent underpaid in four consecutive periods (ive per cent of all tenants);
• nine per cent underpaid in ive or more consecutive periods (eight per cent of all tenants).
Figure 3.6 Highest number of consecutive underpayments
55 This analysis was restricted to the 5,031 tenants who had received at least seven direct 
payments of HB because persistence is dificult to establish over a shorter time frame.
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants with 7+ direct payments of Housing Benefit who are underpayers; DPDP 
Figure 3.7 Highest number of consecutive underpayments; proportion of 
underpayers
Analysis of tenant payment patterns reveals the following typology of payment (see Figure 3.8): 
• full payment: no underpayment56 made while in receipt of direct payment (eight per cent 
of tenants who received at least seven direct payments);
• one-off underpayment: only one underpayment made while in receipt of direct payment 
(17 per cent of tenants who received at least seven direct payments);
• frequent, persistent underpayment: at least three underpayments, made consecutively, 
while in receipt of direct payment (27 per cent of tenants who received at least seven 
direct payments);
• frequent, erratic underpayment: at least three underpayments for tenants who received 
seven to nine direct payments and at least four underpayments for those who received ten 
or more direct payments, with no more than two underpayments made consecutively (26 
per cent of tenants who received at least seven direct payments);
• infrequent underpayment: two or fewer underpayments for tenants who received 7-9 
direct payments, and three or fewer underpayments for those who received ten or more 
direct payments, with no more than two made consecutively (22 per cent of tenants who 
received at least seven direct payments).
56 In this report the term ‘underpayer’ refers to tenants who fail to pay some or all of their 
rent in a given payment period. It therefore includes non-payers as well as partial payers.
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Of the four underpayment groups, three could be described as ‘erratic’ underpayers: those 
underpaying once; those underpaying frequently but erratically; and those underpaying 
infrequently. In total 27 per cent of tenants in the DPDP who received at least seven direct 
payments were persistent underpayers (29 per cent of all underpayment) and 65 per cent 
were erratic underpayers (71 per cent of underpayers) suggesting that, while persistent 
underpayment is certainly a feature of tenants’ payment patterns, it is not as common as 
erratic underpayment.
Figure 3.8 Underpayer types
Persistent underpayment was particularly common early in a tenant’s direct payment career, 
which could suggest teething problems during the transition period. For example:
• approximately one-third of all persistent underpayers (six per cent of all tenants) made the 
irst of several consecutive underpayments in one of their irst three payment period;
• just under one quarter of all persistent underpayers (four per cent of all tenants) had a run 
of at least three consecutive underpayments starting in the irst payment period.
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
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Q10. Amongst those tenants who pay all their rent, do they usually 
 pay on time?
The majority of tenants on direct payments who paid all their rent, paid late57 at 
some point but their payment patterns did not differ markedly from the comparator 
sample. In other words, late payment in full only increased a little as a result of direct 
payments. 
Late payment in full may not affect landlords’ overall rental income58 but it does impact on 
cash low. It is of concern, therefore, that only 21 per cent of the ‘best payers’ (i.e. those 
who paid their rent in full while on direct payments) did not pay any rent late, with 79 per 
cent making at least one late payment. On the other hand, the igures from the comparator 
sample suggest that this is not an issue speciic to direct payments but one which landlords 
encounter regardless of the method of HB payment: 77 per cent of the ‘best payers’ in the 
comparator sample made at least one late payment. 
It is likely that some late payment relects tenants ‘juggling’ different income sources, for 
example using their HB to pay other bills and subsequently paying their rent from other 
beneits such as JSA or Child Beneit. 
Q11. Is there an ‘arrears spike’ at particular times in the calendar year?
There was no signiicant increase in arrears at any particular time of the year (see Figure 
3.9).59 Some stakeholders anticipated an increase in arrears in late autumn/winter as higher 
fuel bills and Christmas stretched tenants’ budgets or during the summer holiday and back to 
school period (a period not fully coved by the 12 months analysis of rent accounts). 
Figure 3.9 shows that payment rates do luctuate amongst direct payment tenants but no 
more so than the comparator sample and without stark seasonal variation. Payment rates did 
‘lat-line’ round November/December 2012, book-ended by periods showing payment rate 
growth, but there was no marked fall in payment rates. In other words, payment rates did not 
increase in line with the payment trajectory, and an ‘interruption’ such as this in a general 
trend can suggest other inluences at play, but the results are certainly not marked. Some 
Project Areas engaged in activities designed to maintain collection rates over the Christmas 
period which may have had an impact.
57 Late payment refers to those tenants who underpaid in one payment period but over 
paid in other rent payment periods to cover this shortfall.
58 Although other costs may be incurred such as arrears recovery and collection costs.
59 This analysis is based on tenants who were put onto direct payment in the irst three 
months of the Demonstration Project (June – August 2012). Those who transferred 
onto direct payment subsequently were excluded because the tendency for tenant 
payment rates to be lower in their irst payment period would have skewed the results.
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Figure 3.9 Payment rates for tenants starting on direct payment in irst quarter; 
not rebased
Q12. Do arrears that accrue in the early stages of direct payment get 
 paid back?
Much of the arrears that accrued in the early stages of direct payment had not been repaid 
at the end of the 18 months’ programme, even though tenant payment behaviour improved 
markedly with time.
A clear picture has emerged from the analysis presented so far: arrears ‘spiked’ in the 
early stages of direct payment implementation but payment patterns improved over time. 
This means that tenants who ultimately showed themselves to be ‘good payers’ and able 
to manage their own rent payments nevertheless encountered dificulties when they irst 


























Summer Autumn Winter Spring Summer Autumn Winter
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: All tenants; DPDP (5,720-3,549); Comparator (4,743-3,408).
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However, although the payment behaviour of many of those tenants who initially failed to pay 
all their rent improved over time, much of the ‘standing arrears’ remained. They may have 
quickly established positive payment behaviour but they did not repay the arrears already built 
up. Tenants and landlords did not ‘recover’ suficiently from this period of transition to remedy 
the inancial impact of it. At the end of the irst three payment periods the difference between 
rent paid and owed was £1.2 million; at the end of the inal payment period the value was £1.9 
million – an increase of just under £650,000 (54 per cent). Early arrears, therefore, were not 
repaid and arrears continued to accumulate, albeit at a slower pace.60 Under UC, there will be 
repayment mechanisms to address this and recoup arrears from tenants. 
The shift to direct payment, then, represented a negative step-change in the overall rent 
account balances of the majority of tenants on direct payment. Of the 60 per cent of DP 
tenants who accrued arrears during their irst three periods since moving onto DP, just 
under four-ifths (79 per cent) were still in arrears61 at the end of the 18 months of DPDP. If 
this pattern repeats when direct payment is rolled out as part of UC it could have a serious 
impact on landlord income – in effect landlords have ‘lost’ a proportion of rental income. 
Some landlords will be better able to accommodate this than others. Ways of focusing efforts 
on recovering ‘early arrears’, and/or of covering this ‘one-off’ loss in the medium term is 
something that landlords will want to think about. DWP has already announced that under 
UC automatic switchback to direct payment will be considered if claimants accrue a certain 
level of arrears.
Examining these indings in further detail, Figure 3.10 shows the inal rent account positions, 
for their time on DPDP, for tenants who were in arrears for periods 1 to 3, broken down by 
the extent to which they underpaid. It shows that few of these tenants had managed to repay 
all their arrears by the end of the demonstration project and that those who underpaid by a 
signiicant amount were the least likely to do so. Speciically, Figure 3.10 shows:
• of the tenants who underpaid signiicantly (by 50 per cent or more – represented by the 
blue columns in Figure 3.10) in their irst three rent payment periods62, 87 per cent were in 
arrears, 76 per cent were in arrears of ive per cent or more, 44 per cent were in arrears of 
15 per cent or more, and 15 per cent were in arrears of 50 per cent or more by the end of 
the demonstration project. These indings suggest that this cohort of tenants managed to 
repay some, but not all of the arrears accrued;
• of the tenants who underpaid by between 15 per cent and 50 per cent in their irst three 
rent payment periods (represented by the red columns in Figure 3.10): 82 per cent were in 
arrears, 46 per cent were in arrears of ive per cent or more, 14 per cent were in arrears of 
15 per cent or more, and just one per cent were in arrears of 50 per cent or more after 18 
months by the end of the demonstration project;
60 This overall picture will mask the fact that while some tenants overpay (to repay 
arrears) others accrue further arrears and that some tenants who keep to repayment 
arrangements may, simultaneously, underpay their rent, The point remains, however, 
that overall, the payment rate did not rise above 100 per cent – the point at which 
arrears start being recouped.
61 For their time on DPDP.
62 i.e. the irst three rent payments due (four weeks rent  per period in all Project Areas 
except Edinburgh where one month’s rent was due each period) following the irst 
direct payment of HB.
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• of the tenants who underpaid by less than 15 per cent in the irst three payment periods 
(represented by the green columns): 68 per cent were in still arrears at the end of the 
demonstration project, but the majority were in arrears of less than ive per cent.
This pattern is more pronounced for tenants who underpaid by 50 per cent or more and 
tenants who underpaid between 15 per cent and 50 per cent when tenants who switched 
back to having their HB paid to their landlord (usually because they had accrued arrears) are 
removed from the analysis.
Figure 3.10 Overall underpayment by underpayment level in rent periods 1-3
Figure 3.11 demonstrates the overall payment rates for tenants who accrued arrears 
during the irst three periods in which they were in receipt of direct payments63. It provides 
a payment rate igure for the irst three rent payment periods following transfer to direct 
payment, the inal 15 rent payment periods combined, and the full period for which tenants 
were in receipt of direct payment.64 It shows that:
63 This analysis removes tenants once they switch back so that each payment period 
includes only those who are still on direct payment.
64 The length of time tenants were on direct payment will vary, depending on when they 
were transferred onto direct payment. Some received 18 direct payments of HB during 


























































Underpaid by 50% or more
Underpaid by less than 15%
Underpaid by 15-50%
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants who underpaid in rent periods 1 to 3; underpaid by less than 15% (1,101);
underpaid by 15-50% (2,680); underpaid by 50% or more (545).
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• the total amount of arrears was not repaid during the 18-month programme; if arrears 
accrued in payment periods 1 to 3 had been repaid, the overall payment rate in periods 
4 to 18 (represented by the red columns) would exceed 100 per cent and at no point do 
we see an overall payment rate of more than 100 per cent. There will be an averaging out 
effect here – some individual tenants will have paid more than 100 per cent of rent owed 
that period (i.e. paid all their rent and additionally repaid arrears from a previous payment 
period) but others will have paid less, bringing the overall payment rate down;
• tenants who underpaid signiicantly (by 50 per cent or more) in their irst three payment 
periods had the lowest overall payment rates. The overall payment rate for tenants who 
underpaid signiicantly in the their irst three periods is represented by the irst green 
column in Figure 3.11, showing that this cohort of tenants only paid 79 per cent of the rent 
owed during the time they were on direct payment. In contrast, the overall payment rates 
for those tenants underpaying by 15 to 50 per cent and by less than 15 per cent were 
higher: 95 per cent and 97 per cent respectively;
• the payment behaviour of tenants who accrued arrears during the irst three periods 
improved considerably in subsequent periods, more closely mirroring the average payment 
rate across the whole direct payment sample. This pattern is made clear by comparing 
the blue columns (representing the irst three payment periods) and the red columns 
(represented payment periods 4 to 18) in Figure 3.11. For example, the overall payment 
rate amongst those who underpaid by 15 to 50 per cent in their irst three periods increase 
from 72 per cent in the irst three payment periods to 100 per cent in the inal 15 payment 
periods. Again, this pattern is more pronounced – and change more marked – amongst 
those who underpaid signiicantly in their irst three payment periods. Their average 
payment rate increased from 28 per cent in the irst three payment periods to 92 per cent 
in the inal 15 payment periods. 
DWP has already announced that under UC automatic switchback to direct payment will be 














































P1-P3 payment rate Overall payment rateP4-P18 payment rate
94
98 97
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants who underpaid in rent periods 1 to 3 and never switched back; underpaid by
less than 15% (889); underpaid by 15-50% (2,067); underpaid by 50% or more (237).
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Figure 3.11 Payment rates for tenants who accrued arrears during the irst three 
periods in which they were in receipt of direct payments (but were not 
switched back)
Q13. What effect does the ‘trigger point’ have on the value of arrears and  
 the number of people entering arrears? And which ‘trigger point’  
 seems most effective?
As was the case at the 12-month stage, it remains impossible to provide robust answers to 
these questions. A number of factors make it very dificult to determine the effect of each of the 
main switchback triggers (4 weeks/one month/8 weeks/12 weeks) on arrears.65
65 Some Project Areas were operating a 4-week/one month switchback trigger, some an 
eight-week trigger and one a 12-week trigger (meaning that tenants who accrue 4 
weeks/one month/eight weeks/we weeks arrears revert back to having their HB paid 
to their landlord). One objective of the DPDP was to trial these different trigger points 
in an effort to identify which was the most effective. To provide additional safeguards, 
other switchback triggers were also devised, designed to prevent tenants from accruing 
arrears over time through underpayment rather than non-payment. Not all Project Areas 
employed all four switchback triggers.
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• The relatively high number of tenants who switched back under the additional ‘partial’ 
repayment triggers (i.e. triggers 3 and 4) and the relatively small number of ‘full’ trigger 
switchbacks
• The inclusion of trigger 4 – underpayment by 15 per cent or more in the preceding 
12 weeks – undermined the ability of those landlords with an eight week or 12 week 
switchback trigger to test their salience. This was because it was possible to meet the 
criteria for trigger 4 with just one missed payment, i.e. before reaching the threshold for the 
main 8-/12-week trigger. For example, if after 12 weeks on direct payment, a tenant whose 
rent is £100 per week fails to make one payment (£400) they would switch back under 
trigger 4 (12 weeks rent is £1,200 and 15 per cent of this is £180). If applied rigorously, it 
is only tenants who fail to pay their rent as soon as they transfer onto direct payment that 
can switch back under the terms of the main trigger. This is relected in the high number 
of trigger 4 switchbacks at a programme level – 495 out of 1,031 made by March 201366 – 
and the acknowledgement by Project Areas that many had occurred as a result of only one 
underpayment.
• Project Areas implemented switchback triggers, and the switchback process differently: 
while some followed agreed protocols to the letter and very mechanistically others adopted 
a more lexible approach, viewing the criteria as loose guidelines. Some landlords used a 
relatively high degree of local discretion, drawing on their knowledge of the tenants. The 
result was tenants who switched back before meeting the criteria for one of the triggers, 
as well as those remaining on direct payment who had accrued the requisite arrears to 
switch back. In addition, the boundary between safeguarding as a result of vulnerability, 
and switching back was sometimes blurred. If information came to light about a tenant 
suggesting that they should have been safeguarded (not put onto direct payment), some 
landlords operated ‘discretionary reversions’, switching a tenant back on these grounds.
Although assessment of the relative impact of each trigger point is not possible, analysis 
shows that a switchback mechanism does help limit arrears. 
In total, 1,438 tenants (20 per cent of all direct payment tenants) switched back to landlord 
payment at least once during the DPDP.67 Some tenants switched back more than once and 
so 1,489 switchbacks were recorded in total. For the purpose of this analysis a tenant was 
categorised as having switched back if:
• the ‘rent destination’ variable changed from ‘payment to tenant’ to ‘payment to landlord;
• and, within two rent payment periods either side of this;
• the Project Area lagged the tenant as a switchback; or 
• the Project area lagged that the tenants had reached the trigger point for switching back.
66 DWP only collected disaggregated switchback data at one point in time: March 2013. 
More recent igures are not therefore available.
67 The switchback igures produced by the rent account analysis differ from those 
collected by DWP as part of the monitoring data. See endnote xviii for full details.
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The switchback igures generated differ from those collected by DWP (see Table 1.2), which 
are higher. This relects the following:
• some switchbacks occurred at the very end of the DPDP after the inal rent account data 
were collected. We know, for example, that approximately 20 tenants in Edinburgh were 
switched back just as the DPDP came to an end but after their inal data were submitted;
• some tenants lagged as a ‘switchback’ continued to receive their HB directly. They may 
have been lagged in error, or the decision to switchback may have been reversed. these 
tenants were removed from analysis but may still have appeared in DWP monitoring data;
• the rent account analysis excludes some tenants because their full rent account or HB 
records were not supplied (see Chapter 2). Some of these may have switched back.
Analysis of the rent accounts of those tenants who met the criteria outlined above and who 
were, therefore, categorised as having switched back revealed that half (51 per cent) of 
all switchbacks occurred in tenants’ irst six rent payment periods, 36 per cent in payment 
periods 7-12 and 17 per cent in payment periods 13 – 18.
Tenants who switched back had much lower overall payment rates during their time on direct 
payment than tenants who did not switch back (79.5 per cent compared with 96.8 per cent 
of tenants who never switched back). While we cannot predict these tenants’ future payment 
behaviour had they not switched back, these results strongly suggest that the switchback 
mechanism did contribute to limiting further arrears.68
Q14. Some tenants who were switched back subsequently switched   
 forward: What do we know about them?
Only 10 per cent of the tenants who were switched back after being on direct payment were 
subsequently ‘switched forward’ (i.e. begun receiving direct payments again) – this compares 
to six per cent in the 12-month analysis. As the number of ‘forward switchers’69 remains low 
the possibilities for detailed analysis of this sub-group are limited. As a result any indings 
must be treated with caution. Notwithstanding this, it is interesting to note that of the tenants 
who were ‘switched forward’:
• 37 per cent were subsequently switched back again, raising questions about the 
effectiveness of efforts to reintroduce direct payments to people who initially failed to 
manage. This is a similar igure to the 12 months’ analysis (39 per cent);
• the average time taken to switch forward was just under ive payment periods: 22 per 
cent were switched forward after only one payment period and 17 per cent were switched 
forward after two payment periods but the majority – 55 per cent – were switched forward 
after at least four payment periods (i.e. after at least a quarter of a year). Although a 
relatively high proportion of tenants were switched forward after one or two payment 
periods the igures are much lower than reported in the 12 months’ analysis when more 
than two-thirds were switched forward in the irst two periods. This might indicate that the 
number of tenants who were initially switched back due to administrative or short-term 
problems rather than ongoing dificulties managing direct payments has reduced over time. 
68 It is important to note that the process and tools for assessing tenants’ readiness for 
direct payment has changed since the DPDP started. Under current practice many 
tenants who went onto direct payment in the DPDP would not do so now.
69 Switching tenants forward was not a key focus of the DPDP which partly explains why 
so few switchback tenants were put back onto direct payment.
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Q15. Do people with certain characteristics seem more prone to arrears  
 than others? What factors seem to most affect the impact of direct  
 payment?
In order to target collection activity effectively and minimise the inancial risk associated with 
direct payment, landlords and other stakeholders need to identify those tenants most at risk 
of accruing arrears and the factors which drive underpayment. Only then can appropriate 
intervention, prevention and action be implemented. Of course, landlords will need to do 
their own local analysis and make efforts to understand the payment behaviour of their 
own tenants. However, analysis across the DPDP suggests that the following factors, 
circumstances and characteristics impacted most70 on the likelihood of tenants accruing 
arrears in a rent payment period:
• tenants who paid part or all of their rent by Direct Debit were statistically less likely to 
underpay their rent (including non-payment) than those using other payment methods. 
For example, 54 per cent of tenants who ever paid their rent by Direct Debit underpaid at 
some point while on direct payment.71 This compared with 67 per cent of those who never 
paid by Direct Debit. Direct Debit also has relatively low transaction costs which may make 
this payment method even more attractive. Landlords will, however, need to balance this 
against evidence from the wider evaluation that tenants appreciate being offered a range 
of payment methods and that Direct Debit is not appropriate for everyone;
• the likelihood of underpaying reduced with age. Households in which the lead HB claimant 
was under 25 years were most likely to underpay or not pay their rent, and those in which 
the lead claimant was aged 55+ years were least likely to do so;
• single people and ‘other households’72 were on average more likely to underpay their rent, 
while ‘couples with no dependants’ were least likely to underpay their rent;
• rent levels were found to have some inluence payment rates: tenants with relatively ‘high’ 
rent levels (over £115 per week) were more likely to underpay by levels greater than 15 
per cent than those tenants with relatively ‘low’ rent levels;
• tenants where either the lead claimant or a partner worked 16 hours or more per week 
were less likely to underpay by ‘any amount’, to underpay by 50 per cent or more and by 
75 per cent or more than those where neither the claimant or partner worked;
• compared with tenants on full HB, those on partial HB were signiicantly more likely to 
underpay by any amount, by 15 per cent or more and by 5 per cent or more. However, 
they were less likely to underpay by larger amounts: 50 per cent or more, 75 per cent or 
more or not pay at all. This raises the question whether tenants on partial HB, who were 
already paying part of the rent themselves, were better equipped to manage the shift to 
direct payment;
70 Rent account data provides only limited proile information, including tenants’ age, 
housing type, and whether they are on full or partial HB.  The analysis is necessarily 
limited by the information available and there will be other factors affecting a tenant’s 
vulnerability to arrears.
71 This refers to tenants who were recorded by landlords as paying by Direct Debit at some 
point while on direct payment. Underpayments may have occurred in a period when they 
were not paying by Direct Debit. In addition, one landlord allowed tenants to set up partial 
Direct Debits so that the Direct Debit covered part, but not all of the rent owed.
72 Households which are not any of the following: couples, couples with dependent 
children, lone parent or single person.
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• compared with tenants not affected by Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS):
 – those affected by the 14 per cent reduction in their HB73 rate were more likely to 
underpay by 5 per cent or more; they were not signiicantly more or less likely to 
underpay by levels greater than that which their HB had been reduced;
 – those who were affected by the 25 per cent reduction in their HB were more likely to 
underpay by any amount, 5 per cent or more and 25 per cent or more; they were not 
signiicantly more or less likely to underpay by an amount greater than the reduction in 
their HB as a result of the RSRS;
• interestingly there were no discernible differences between the characteristics and 
circumstances of tenants who underpaid, and those who paid no rent at all.
These indings offer some insight into those tenants who may be more vulnerable to accruing 
arrears, the potential ‘risk factors’, and circumstances that correlate with positive payment 
behaviour (Direct Debit, for example). And because the same trends have been identiied 
here as were in the 12-month analysis there can be a high degree of conidence in these 
indings. But rent account data can only tell us so much. It cannot, for example, reveal the 
relationship between tenants’ attitudes or inancial capabilities and their vulnerability to 
arrears. A survey of tenants has, however, been conducted and the results will help build 
the picture further (see Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: The longitudinal survey of 
tenants, DWP Research Report No. 889).
Q16. What impact have other welfare reforms had on direct payment? 
 Does being on direct payment better equip tenants to manage other  
 welfare reforms?
In terms of the various welfare reforms introduced during the DPDP it was only possible to 
examine the impact of the RSRS. Information was also provided about tenants affected by 
the Beneit Cap but they were too few in number to permit robust analysis. 
Analysis of the impact of the RSRS suggests that it had a slight impact on payment rates in 
the DPDP but not markedly. There is some evidence to suggest that the RSRS had slightly 
less impact on direct payment tenants in terms of payment rates, than on the comparator 
sample. However, caution is required, as it is still too early to assess the impact of this reform 
– introduced in April 2013 – as the last rent account data analysed for this report dates from 
November 2013.
Figure 3.12 shows that: 
• the average payment rate for the six periods before DPDP tenants were irst affected by 
the RSRS was £1.00 per £1 of rent charged;
• once the RSRS was introduced, the average payment rate amongst direct payment 
tenants affected fell to £0.98 per £1 of rent charged: a reduction in the average payment 
rate of 1.9 pence per pound of rent;
• as might be expected, the reduction in average payment rates was greater for tenants 
affected by the 25 per cent rate compared to the 14 per cent rate: reductions of 3.7 pence 
per £1 of rent and 1.5 pence per £1 of rent respectively.
73 In April 2013 new HB rules for working-age people living in social housing were 
introduced whereby households with one spare bedroom (i.e. one bedroom in excess 
of their households needs) have their HB reduced by 14 per cent while households with 
two or more spare bedrooms have their HB reduced by 25 per cent.
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However, there is some evidence that the RSRS had slightly less impact on direct payment 
tenants, than on tenants not in receipt of direct payment. The average reduction in payment 
rates amongst direct payment tenants affected by the RSRS was 1.9 pence per £1 of rent, 
compared with 2.8 pence per £1 of rent for the comparator sample. 
Looking at the proportion of DPDP tenants failing to pay some or all of their rent reveals a 
similar pattern. Figure 3.13 shows that:
• the percentage of tenants affected by the RSRS who underpaid their rent in a given 
payment period was at least six percentage points higher than the average rate for the six 
periods prior to the RSRS;
• the average proportion of tenants underpaying increased from 24 per cent prior to the 
RSRS to 36 per cent once the policy was introduced;
• tenants underpaying by less than 15 per cent and between 50 per cent and 15 per cent 
saw the largest increases;
• there is some evidence that DPDP tenants have been affected slightly less than those in 
the comparator sample: the average proportion of direct payment tenants underpaying 
increased by 12 percentage points (to 36 per cent) while the proportion of comparator 
sample tenants underpaying increased by 19 percentage points (to 46 per cent).
Tenants affected by the RSRS who are awarded Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs) 
fared better, particularly amongst the comparator sample:
• the average proportion of direct payment tenants affected by the RSRS who underpaid 
(including non-payment) was 1.8 percentage points lower amongst those receiving DHP; 
in the comparator sample the rate of underpayment was some 17 percentage points lower 
for those receiving DHPs
• the average payment rate of tenants affected by the RSRS was slightly higher for those 
receiving DHPs: 98.8 pence per pound of rent compared with 98.2 pence per pound of 
rent for tenants who did not receive a DHP 
• there was a more marked difference in average payment rates when looking at the 
comparator sample: £1.04 per pound of rent for tenants who did receive a DHP compared 
with 97.6 pence per pound of rent for tenants who did not.
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Rent payment period: rebased
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants affected by RSRS; DPDP either rate (1,395-659);
DPDP 14% rate(1,168-542); DPDP 25% rate (227-117).
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Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base: Tenants affected by RSRS; DPDP (1,395-659).
Figure 3.13 Percentage of tenants affected by the RSRS underpaying
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Figure 3.14 Percentage of DP and comparator tenants affected by the 
RSRS underpaying
Q18. Does direct payment increase the likelihood of tenants entering 
employment?
In the DPDP, direct payment was associated with a greater likelihood of entering 
employment, although the results must be treated with caution. We cannot assert causality 
here – other factors may have been at play – and the method used gives indicative results 
only. The analysis could, for example, include people whose income increased signiicantly 
for reasons other than employment. Nevertheless, a higher proportion of direct payment 
tenants entered employment than comparator sample tenants.
A proxy ‘in work indicator’ was created using HB records where ‘in work’ was deined as: 
• the claimant or the claimant’s partner doing 16 hours or more remunerative work per week; or




























Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base:  Tenants affected by RSRS; DPDP (1,395-659); Comparator (1,179-628).
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Under this deinition 21 per cent of DPDP tenants were in work when they started receiving 
direct payment. An equivalent proportion of comparator tenants were also in work. By the 
last period when HB data were available:
• the proportion of DPDP tenants in work had increased to 23 per cent, an increase of 1.3 
percentage points;74
• the proportion of comparator tenants in work had remained static at 21 per cent.75
Q19. In addition to arrears, are there other costs to landlords of 
 implementing direct payment? 
Yes, there are additional costs associated with delivering direct payment but it is not 
possible to quantify them, because no systematic assessment of costs was undertaken by 
Project Areas as part the DPDP, and comprehensive monitoring data were not available 
to generate an estimate of additional costs. However, landlords were aware of the type of 
costs associated with direct payment – they simply had not collated and quantiied them in a 
systematic way. For example, one noted that some of the staff costs associated with direct 
payment were indirect, i.e. accrued by staff not working directly on the project, but they were 
unable to quantify this important ‘hidden’ cost: 
‘I think whatever the costs were we probably underestimated the real cost of it. I think 
we’ve had [Project Lead] and her team who’ve been managing the project very well 
and their direct costs. But supporting [Project Lead] in order to get the information 
she needs to do her job and feed the different machines that need feeding. There’s a 
myriad of other teams who will have invested a lot of time and capacity which will have 
been indirect and hidden. But all of that will have been very helpful in us understanding 
what we need to do for the future so it’s helpful but we can’t underestimate the cost of 
that investment.’
(Finance Director, housing association)
When exploring the issue of the cost of direct payment it is important to focus not just on 
costs but also on resource as many of the additional activities undertaken by landlords did 
not result in direct, additional costs to them, even though additional resource was employed. 
Landlords identiied a number of areas where the delivery and management of direct 
payment had resulted in the use of additional resource and increased costs: 
• staff time, which was seen as being the biggest cost. For example, all Project Areas 
appointed a dedicated DPDP project manager and in most areas this represented 
additional stafing. And several employed additional housing/tenancy support workers 
(ranging from 0.5 – 1.75 FTE) when it became clear capacity in existing teams was not 
suficient;
• the cost of upgrading and improving rent collection and recovery IT systems. A 
number of landlords purchased new software packages because their existing IT systems 
were not compatible with direct payment, with a common ‘gripe’ being that they could 
not provide the ‘live’, current data, that direct payment demanded. These packages 
could be relatively expensive – one landlord, for example, reported spending £50,000 on 
purchasing one: ‘Our biggest challenge is our IT system… we were having to do so many 
things manually… so we invested £50,000 in xxx [rent collection software package]….’
74 Statistically signiicant at a 0.05 level; the 95 per cent conident levels on change are 
0.006 to 0.020.
75 The 95 per cent conident levels on change are -0.007 to 0.007.
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• the cost of communicating with tenants. There were (non-staff) cost/resource 
implications for all four of the most commonly used communication methods used by 
landlords: letter writing; telephoning; face-to-face visits; and SMS texting. A number 
of landlords used texts to remind tenants to pay their rent and reported that it was an 
effective way of boosting payment rates:
‘SMS messaging in advance reminding tenants about making future payments [has 
been important] … it was very effective in early December [2012].’
• payment transaction costs. Because more tenants were paying their rent, transaction 
costs increased. However, there is another reason behind this increase: the fees charged 
by pre-payment card providers. For example, one landlord noted:
‘Our transaction costs have gone up because we have to pay a fee every time a tenant 
pays their rent using a pre-payment card … and there’s a ceiling of £150 … I think they 
pay 40 pence per transaction … it’s costing us a lot of money … we worked out that it is 
costing us £440 in additional costs for our tenants.’
(Lead Oficer, housing association)
However, it is important to note that there were also cost savings associated with the 
introduction of some of the activities above. For example, a number of landlords reported that 
text reminders improved their collection rates. And the landlord that had introduced a new 
£50,000 IT system believed that it resulted in less staff hours being spent of identifying tenants 
in arrears and a much more effective IT system: ‘that [£50,000] sounds a lot of money but it 
provides data on weekly basis, which is a big improvement on our old system which provided it 
monthly’. However, none of the DPDP landlords could provide an accurate assessment of the 
cost and resource savings accruing from the introduction of these types of measures. 
Q20. What was the impact of direct payment on the overall inancial   
 sustainability of landlords? 
The impact was very limited. However, this has less to do with impact of direct payment per 
se and more to do with the scale of the DPDP programme – for most participating landlords, 
DPDP tenants represented a relatively small proportion of their tenants. Therefore, it is 
perhaps more pertinent to ask what will be the impact of direct payment under UC? 
This was a question posed to participating landlords and lenders76 interviewed as part of the 
study. There was a consensus amongst both groups that UC would not threaten the inancial 
viability of most landlords, particularly those with larger housing stocks. And there was a 
widespread belief that one of the concerns highlighted by some housing commentators about 
direct payment at the beginning of the programme – that it would result in loan covenants 
being breached because of higher arrears – was unlikely to be an issue under UC:
‘I’d be very surprised if it’s that extreme [in terms of loan covenants being breached].. 
Something’s got to have gone seriously wrong in that association for it to have that 
level of impact. Putting decent reporting in place, having the right people to react 
quickly and having the fall back of switching people out of direct payment. I’d be very 
surprised if it goes to that extent.’
(Lender)
76 Interviews were conducted with representatives from lender institutions, a credit rating 
agency, and the Council for Mortgage Lenders at the beginning and end of the DPDP 
programme, with in all, 16 interviews being conducted.
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However, there was concern that direct payment under UC would erode landlords’ surpluses, 
making it more dificult for them to build. For example, a DPDP landlord noted:
‘The big impact is the ability to generate a reasonable surplus that goes into developing 
new homes … the real impact is we develop fewer homes which as a social landlord 
is not where you want to be at … you soon reach a point where we’re hardly building, 
that’s the big risk for us.’
In a similar vein, a lender noted: 
‘I think the narrative is more about it affects their ability to develop … they [social 
housing landlords] would dip into more funding. But the Government is reducing grant 
rates so therefore they’re having to take on exponentially more funding. So the irst 
thing they do is not borrow; stop developing; just batten down the hatches.’
(Lender)
Furthermore, it is also important to note that some landlords and lenders believed that direct 
payment under UC may pose a threat to the overall sustainability of some smaller landlords.
‘I think for the nature of our customers, which tend to be large inancially robust housing 
associations, we’re not seeing it [direct payment] as a huge risk. I think the issue is 
more around if you’re a small housing association and you haven’t got the liquidity and 
cash low; if you’ve potentially got customers with complex needs it may be a different 
outcome …some associations might only have a couple of hundred units, if you have 
a delay in their rent payments for a couple of weeks it could be quite serious for them 
if they haven’t got the cash resources to deal with that … the big boys, the likes of 
[DPDP landlord] won’t have that problem cos they’ve got suficient resources elsewhere 
to manage any … if you’ve got a specialist housing association dealing with particular 
people … if there’s a delay in their payments it could be troublesome for them.’
(Lender)
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4 Conclusion
It is worth noting that when the DPDP programme was conceived there was concern that 
the rent arrears of participating landlords would increase very dramatically. However, this 
did not happen – there was a consensus amongst local stakeholders and lenders that they 
had not increased as much as had been anticipated. Direct payment in the DPDP did have a 
inancial impact on landlords and tenants but much of this burden was borne in the irst few 
months following migration. Over the full 18 months of the DPDP, direct payment tenants 
failed to pay 4.5 per cent of the rent owed (compared with 0.9 per cent in a comparator 
sample of tenants not on direct payment) but nearly half of these accrued in the irst month/
four-week period following migration. By the end of the 18 months of the programme, rent 
payment rates amongst tenants who had been on direct payment for the duration had fallen 
to two percentage points lower than the comparator sample; and the net additional impact77 
of direct payment in these later payment periods was 2.1 percentage points less rent paid 
than if direct payment had not been introduced.
A clear picture emerged, then, of a distinct and signiicant drop in rent payment rates when 
tenants irst migrated to direct payment, with payment rates improving dramatically over time, 
stabilising at slightly below both baseline and comparator rates. Average rent payment rates 
were very low during tenants’ irst few payment periods (tenants’ irst rent payments averaged 
67 per cent of rent owed) and the proportion of tenants accruing arrears very high (59 per cent 
of tenants failed to pay all their rent following their irst direct payment of HB). But tenants’ 
payment behaviour quickly improved, such that payment rates were only slightly lower than 
the comparator sample once tenants had been receiving direct payment for a few months, and 
the proportion of tenants failing to pay their rent reduced dramatically. In fact, the proportion of 
tenants failing to pay their rent in a given period quickly returned to near baseline levels (i.e. 
before direct payment was introduced) and, in some periods, the proportion of tenants failing 
to pay all their rent was lower than before the introduction of direct payment. Of the £1.9m 
shortfall in the value of rent not paid during the DPDP, 65 per cent was attributable to tenants’ 
irst three rent payments following migration to direct payment.
Interim analysis after the irst 12 months of the DPDP had already identiied this early spike 
in arrears.78 At that time it was not clear whether early arrears relected challenges inherent 
in migrating tenants to a new system – a period of transition during which tenants acclimatise 
to the new system and learn to manage direct payment – or simply relected that direct 
payments was in its infancy and was implemented in the DPDP as part of an experimental 
programme trialling and testing the policy. The majority of direct payment recipients were 
transferred to the new system during the irst six months or so of the DPDP, when learning 
was still accruing and new systems and processes were being tried and tested. In this 
context, an arrears spike was, perhaps, to be expected in the DPDP but would be unlikely 
to repeat during roll out. The purpose of the DPDP was, after all, to learn lessons so that 
systems and processes could be adapted and problems and challenges rectiied for roll out.
However, further analysis for this report strongly suggests that the early arrears spike cannot 
be attributed primarily to the infancy of the direct payment policy or the experimental nature 
of the DPDP. Relatively low initial payment rates are likely to be a feature of direct payment 
going forward. The transition to direct payments appears to be a critical point in the process, 
77 ‘Net additional impact’ refers to the estimated impact over and above what might have 
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particularly as most of the debt accrued during this period remained as ‘standing arrears’. In 
other words, the overall picture is one where some tenants struggled initially, quickly learned 
to manage direct payments, but did not repay (or landlords struggled to collect) the early 
arrears accrued.
These results point clearly to the need for mitigating action during the transition to direct 
payment, whether in the form of support to tenants, close monitoring of rent accounts, 
cautious assessments of tenants’ readiness for direct payment, ongoing support assessment 
processes or other intervention. Improving payment rates during tenants’ irst three payments 
would reduce the negative impact of direct payments on landlords’ income signiicantly. For 
example, if we remove the irst three payment periods (the ‘spike’) from analysis, the overall 
difference between the amount of rent tenants paid and owed drops from 4.5 per cent to 2.1 
per cent, against the comparator sample arrears rate over the same period of 1.2 per cent, a 
difference of just 0.9 per cent.
The fact that payment rates improved signiicantly after the irst few payment periods and 
that effective action in the transition to direct payment has the potential to mitigate the 
negative overall impact of direct payment is good news. A few words of caution, however. 
Firstly, direct payment does continue to impact on landlords and tenants in the longer term. 
The impact may be well below that of the irst few payment periods but even once tenants 
have been receiving direct payment for 16 periods or more they still, on average, pay 2.1 
percentage points less rent in a given period than if their HB were paid to their landlord. In 
effect, direct payment has introduced a step change in rent accounts and landlords will need 
to manage the inancial implications of that shift. Some may be better equipped to do so 
than others. Secondly, although the proportion of tenants accruing arrears quickly returns to 
baseline levels, the value of their arrears increased. In other words, the composition of rent 
underpayment shifts under a direct payment system. In many respects this has been the 
key consequence of the introduction of direct payment: it introduced the potential (or risk) 
for tenants to underpay rent by a signiicant amount. Put simply, when tenants do underpay 
they are more likely to do so by a larger amount than under the previous system. Thirdly, it is 
important to acknowledge that even if the spike can be mitigated, more tenants enter arrears 
under a direct payment system. Direct payment has not just introduced a degree of risk for 
landlords, but also for tenants, many of whom are managing on limited budgets and already 
have debts and inancial commitments they are struggling to meet. The package of help and 
support available is important in this context.
Of course, the introduction of direct payment in the DPDP had impacts on both landlords 
and tenants that reached far beyond the inancial implications detailed in this report. For 
example, the introduction of direct payment prompted participating landlords to consider new 
ways of working and to relect on organisational and cultural changes required to meet these 
new demands, as well as on their relationship with their tenants. Small but signiicant shifts 
were also seen in tenants’ attitudes, behaviours and money management skills. Such issues 
were outside the scope of this report but are detailed further in two accompanying reports 
(see Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: The longitudinal survey of tenants, 
DWP Research Report No. 889, and Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key indings of 
the programme evaluation – Final report, DWP Research Report No. 890).
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Appendix 
Additional tables
Table A.1 Proportion of rent paid in all payment periods, and in all direct payment 
payment periods












Rent account compared with opening balance
More than 1 period’s arrears 97 94
Between 1 period’s worth of arrears and credit 96 95
More than 1 period’s credits 91 90
Household type
Couple 97 96
Couple with dependents 96 95
Single person 95 95
Lone parent 95 94
Other 96 95
Ever paid by Direct Debit




One off underpayment 98 99
Infrequent underpayment 98 98
Frequent erratic underpayment 96 96
Frequent persistent underpayment 93 92
Stage onto DPDP
Stage 1 or 2 96 95
Stage 3 to 5 95 94
Stage 6 or later 94 91
Affected by RSRS
Affected by RSRS 97 96
Not affected by RSRS 95 94
Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise.
Base: All tenants; All periods (7,252); DP periods (7,252).
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Table A.2 Proportion of tenants who had accrued arrears, or additional arrears by 
the end of the DPDP (counting all periods, and counting only periods 
where HB was paid direct to the tenant)












Rent account compared with opening balance
More than 1 period’s arrears 48 59
Between 1 period’s worth of arrears and credit 62 65
More than 1 period’s credits 80 77
Household type
Couple 57 60
Couple with dependents 61 65
Single person 60 63
Lone parent 63 66
Other 62 65
Ever paid by Direct Debit




One off underpayment 63 63
Infrequent underpayment 55 56
Frequent erratic underpayment 66 68
Frequent persistent underpayment 76 78
Stage onto DPDP
Stage 1 or 2 64 66
Stage 3 to 5 60 63
Stage 6 or later 54 58
Affected by RSRS
Affected by RSRS 61 65
Not affected by RSRS 62 64
Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise.
Base: All tenants; All periods (7,252); DP periods (7,252).
70
Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 
Key indings of the 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise
Technical endnotes
i This involved a number of key tasks:
• for those landlords not submitting all of their tenants into projects, selecting which of 
their tenants would participate in projects;
• providing input into the design of the DPDPs programme and, working alongside the 
DWP, designing the delivery framework in their areas;
• engaging with the tenants selected and informing them about the DPDP;
• selecting tenants to be included in the direct payment programme;
• assessing tenants’ preparedness for direct payment, the so-called support assessment 
process;
• making tenants ready for direct payment;
• putting in place support mechanisms to help tenants manage on direct payment.
ii After the programme went ‘live’, Project Areas began undertaking other tasks: rent 
collection; recovering rent arrears; and the switchback process i.e. the process by which 
tenants who have fallen into arrears are transferred back to landlord payment from direct 
payment. How Project Areas have approached these tasks and the other DPDP tasks they 
have undertaken, is explored in the publication: Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: 
Learning the lessons, six months in, which can be downloaded at: www.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/iles/direct-payments-learning-lessons.pdf 
iii In addition to Rent Account Analysis (RAA), the research comprised the following key 
elements:
• Tenant surveys. A key element of the study was three (face-to-face) household surveys: 
 – a ‘Baseline’ Survey of 1,965 tenants in the six Project Areas was conducted between 
May and July 2012;
 – a second stage, follow-up survey of 1,844 tenants (including 1,227 who were surveyed 
in the Baseline Survey) was undertaken between June and November 2013;
 – a third and inal survey took place early in 2014, which involved 589 tenants being 
interviewed, many of whom had participated in the Baseline and Second Surveys.
• The study team also undertook a telephone survey of tenants who had been switched-
back under the two underpayments triggers: triggers 3 and 4. This involved 95 tenants 
being interviewed in the autumn of 2013.
• Qualitative interviews with tenants. This encompassed a number of strands, 
including: a panel of six tenants in each area who were interviewed face-to-face in 
June/July 2012, January 2013, June 2013, and January/February 2014, and with whom 
regular telephone contact was maintained; a panel of two tenants in each area who 
had switched back to landlord payment, interviewed in January 2013, June 2013 and 
January 2014, and with whom regular telephone contact was maintained; and face-to-
face interviews with at least 24 additional tenants across the six Project Areas in January 
2014. In addition, the study team also undertook bespoke qualitative exercises, which 
involved in-depth interviews, with two groups of particular interest to it and DWP: ‘new’ 
tenants (i.e. those tenants who have been put onto the programme since August 2013) 
and underpayers.
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• Qualitative interviews with stakeholders. This included: telephone interviews 
with national stakeholders, such as lenders and people with expertise in money 
management, conducted in two waves at the beginning and towards the end of the 
evaluation; focus groups with Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) oficers (in 
February 2013 and January 2014); interactive feedback events, which brought together 
stakeholders from the six Project Areas (in January 2013, December 2013 and March 
2014); and a local stakeholder panel comprising approximately six key oficers in each 
Project Area who reported on emerging issues, through face-to-face and telephone 
interviews and emails, between June 2012 and early 2014.
iv In addition to ive (succinct) learning reports, which highlighted the key learning to emerge 
from projects areas, the study team has produced the following written outputs: 
• Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: Findings from a Baseline Survey of tenants in 
ive Project Areas in England and Wales. This report, which was published in 2012, was 
concerned with establishing a baseline position for tenants in the Project Areas and drew 
on data generated by the ‘Baseline Survey’ to do so. The report can be downloaded 
from the DWP website at: 
 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/193327/rrep822.pdf 
• Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: Learning the lessons, six months in. This 
report, which was published in May 2013, focused on highlighting the key learning 
to emerge from the irst six months of the programme being ‘live’. It drew solely 
on qualitative material garnered from stakeholders and tenants. The report can be 
downloaded from the DWP website at:
 www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/iles/direct-payments-learning-lessons.pdf 
• Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 12 months in extended learning report. This 
report, which was published in July 2014, highlighted the key learning to emerge from 
the irst 12 months of the programme being ‘live’ i.e. from June 2012 until 2013. While 
it made extensive reference to qualitative material gathered from a range of sources, it 
also drew on quantitative material, speciically data generated from the stage two survey 
and rent account data. The report can be downloaded from the DWP website at:
 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/333076/dpdp-12-
months-in-extended-learning-report.pdf
• Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key indings of the 12 months’ Rent Account 
Analysis exercise. This report, which was published in July 2014, highlighted the key 
issues to emerge from the 12 months’ RAA exercise. It analysed rent account data 
generated for the irst 12 months of the DPDP programme being ‘live’ i.e. from June 
2012 until 2013. The report can be downloaded from the DWP website at:
 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/334357/dpdp-
key-indings-of-the-12-months-rent-account-analysis-exercise.pdf 
• Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Report from the stage 2 survey of tenants. This 
report, which was published in July 2014, highlighted the key indings of the second 
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• Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Rent ‘underpayment’. This report, which was 
published in July 2014, was concerned with highlighting the key issues to emerge from 
the research into underpayment. It drew on data generated from: landlord rent accounts; 
a telephone survey of underpayers; and in-depth interviews with 20 tenants who took 
part in this survey.
 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/333073/dpdp-
rent-underpayment.pdf
• Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: The longitudinal survey of tenants. This report, 
which has been published at the same time as this report, presents the key indings of the 
third stage tenant survey. In doing so, data gleaned from this survey is compared with that 
derived from the ‘Baseline’ and Second Stage Surveys. Direct Payments Demonstration 
Projects: The longitudinal survey of tenants, DWP Research Report No. 889.
• Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key indings of the programme evaluation – 
inal report. This report, which has been published at the same time as this report, pulls 
together all the analysis undertaken by the study team to highlight the evaluation’s 
key indings. Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key indings of the programme 
evaluation – inal report, DWP Research Report No. 890.
v The HM Treasury Magenta and Green Books and Value for Money and Assessment 
Guidance.
vi The adoption of a quasi-experimental approach involves comparing change in rent account 
behaviours (primarily, rent payment rates) for DPDP tenants before and after switching 
to direct payment with a sample of ‘comparator’ tenants from the same local authority 
area who are not on direct payment. Adopting this approach gives net additional impact 
over and above what might plausibly have expected to happen in the absence of direct 
payment: the counterfactual. It also factors into the analysis recognition that payment rates 
may in any case vary through time, for example, due to:
• seasonal factors, such as Christmas, summer holidays or annual rent changes;
• landlords operating rent free weeks;
• changes to economy;
• and the introduction of other welfare reforms.
vii Propensity score matching gives tenants an overall score based on their characteristics, 
with discrete characteristics being assigned different scores. Direct payment tenants 
were matched to a comparator tenant with the nearest score: their ‘nearest neighbour’. 
Comparator tenants were allowed to be matched with more than one direct payment 
tenant depending on how many direct payment tenants they were ‘nearest neighbour’ to. 
The number of direct payment tenants which comparator tenants were matched against 
was then used as a weighting factor in the inal analysis. Some comparator tenants were 
not matched and were removed from the analysis.
viii Rent payment periods have been linked to HB payments and allow for a reasonable 
timeframe for the tenant to receive their beneit and to make a payment(s). They end on the 
last day which landlords allowed for payments to be made after which they determined that 
payment was late and therefore additional actions could be adopted to reclaim the monies 
owed. The grace period between HB payment and the end of the rent payment period was 
determined locally and often depended on dates which the landlord ran arrears reports.
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Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base:   All tenants; DP sample (7,252); DPDP sample (7,252); Comparator (4,941).
ix Note igure 1 shows how the shortfall in rent collected accumulated during the irst 18 
payment periods of the DPDP
Note igure 1 Accumulation of shortfall in value of rent not collected during irst 18  
 payment periods
x Note igure 2 shows how the sum of individual tenant’s arrears (payments excluding over 
payments) accumulated during the irst 18 payment periods of the DPDP.
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Note igure 2 Accumulation of individual tenant’s arrears during irst 
 18 payment periods
 The analysis developed in this report has involved creating artiicial rent accounts for 
tenants covering their period of DPDP. Analysis of what has happened to actual rent 
accounts reveals at the point of transfer onto direct payment 4,217 DPDP tenants (59 per 
cent) had arrears, totalling £1.9 million (equivalent to 2.3 per cent of their total annual rent 
roll). By the end of the demonstration project 5,647 DPDP tenants (78 per cent) were in 
arrears, the value of which had increased to £2.953 million (equivalent to 6.3 per cent of 
their total annual rent roll). 
 In comparison 55 per cent of comparator tenants were in arrears at the baseline, with their 
value of arrears being equivalent to 2.4 per cent of their total annual rent roll. This had 
increased to 58 per cent of comparator tenant by the end of the demonstration project. 





















































Rent payment period: rebased
Source: 18 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise.
Base:   All tenants; DP sample (7,252); DPDP sample (7,252); Comparator (4,941).
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xi The analysis revealed that direct payment has had a net additional impact of -0.055, 
which is statistically signiicant at a 0.001 level. If we include the opening balance for 
the rent period in the model – so, for example, taking into account that a tenant maybe 
overpaying to payback previous arrears – the estimated impacts are higher. Overall impact 
is estimated to be -0.067: tenants on direct payment paid 6.7 percentage points less 
per rent payment period. Similarly impacts by quarter on direct payment become: 16.3 
percentage points higher arrears quarter 1; 3.9 percentage points higher arrears in quarter 
2; 2.3 percentage points higher arrears in quarter 3; 3.4 percentage points higher arrears 
in quarter 4, 4.6 percentage points higher arrears in quarter 5 and 3.1 percentage points 
higher arrears in quarter 6.
xii Signiicant at a 0.001 level
xiii Signiicant at a 0.001 level
xiv Signiicant at a 0.001 level
xv Signiicant at a 0.001 level
xvi Signiicant at a 0.001 level
xvii Signiicant at a 0.001 level
xviii For this analysis, a tenant was categorised as having switched back if the ‘rent destination’ 
variable changed from ‘payment to tenant’ to ‘payment to landlord and either (a) the Project 
Area lagged the tenant as a switchback (all Project Areas were asked to do this) or b) the 
Project area lagged that the tenants had reached the trigger point for switching back. The 
switchback igures generating by analysis of rent accounts differs, recording fewer 504 
switchbacks, from the Monitoring Information collected by DWP (see Note table 1). This 
relects that: a) some switchbacks occurred at the very end of the DPDP after the inal rent 
account data were collected; b) some tenants lagged as a ‘switchback’ continued to receive 
their HB directly and so would not have been included in the rent account analysis, and c) 
some tenants were removed from the RAA because their full rent account or Housing Beneit 
data were not available. 
Note table 1 Comparison of switchbacks in the Rent Account Analysis data with 
monitoring data collected by DWP
Rent Account 








Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise and DWP monitoring data.
Base: All tenants.
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Note table 2 Number of switchbacks in the Rent Account Analysis data by rent 
payment period; rebased
Rent payment period Number of switchbacks
Percentage of all 
switchbacks
Cumulative number 
percentage of tenants 
on DP
1 0 0 0
2 75 5 1
3 148 10 3
4 238 16 6
5 143 10 8
6 144 10 10
7 126 8 12
8 115 8 14
9 71 5 15
10 119 8 16
11 63 4 17
12 41 3 18
13 41 3 18
14 39 3 19
15 33 2 19
16 31 2 20
17 50 3 20
18 12 1 21
Total 1,489  
Source: 18 months’ RAA exercise.
Base: All tenants; DPDP (7,252).
xix Statistical modelling techniques were used to explore whether the characteristics and 
circumstances of tenants impacted on the likelihood of them underpaying or not paying 
their rent under direct payment . The analysis looked at the likelihood of underpayment in 
six contexts: i) any underpayment; ii) underpayment by 5 per cent or more; iii) 15 per cent 
or more; iv) 50 per cent or more; v) 75 per cent or more; and vi) no payment.
